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Summary 
Mounting evidence suggests a causal role of negative emotion in delusions (Ben-
Zeev, Ellington, Swendsen, & Granholm, in press; Lincoln, Peter, Schäfer, & Moritz, 
2009). Particularly, fluctuations in anxiety and self-esteem seem to trigger delusional 
ideation (Thewissen et al., 2011). Consequently, the ability to down-regulate negative 
emotions is likely to help to prevent or reduce delusional ideation. Despite the clear 
theoretical relevance, emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal (i.e. changing the 
perspective on a situation in order to modify emotional responses) or expressive 
suppression (i.e. inhibiting facial expressions of emotions; ‘poker face’) have not been 
researched in delusions so far.  
The present dissertation project fills this gap by investigating emotion regulation 
in paranoia- and delusion-prone samples. Study 1 revealed bivariate and multivariate 
associations between emotion regulation difficulties and paranoia-proneness 
(Westermann & Lincoln, 2011). Study 2 experimentally demonstrated that delusion-prone 
individuals had difficulties in successfully applying the emotion regulation strategy 
reappraisal while watching anxiety-eliciting pictures, but not in applying expressive 
suppression (Westermann, Rief, & Lincoln, submitted). Furthermore, unsuccessful 
emotion regulation was correlated with state delusional ideation exclusively during 
reappraisal. The potentially maladaptive nature of reappraisal in delusion was further 
corroborated in study 3 (Westermann, Kesting, & Lincoln, in press). Under social stress, 
paranoia-prone individuals who habitually use reappraisal experienced an increase in state 
paranoia. 
Taken together, the present dissertation project provides subclinical evidence for 
specific difficulties in applying the generally helpful and adaptive emotion regulation 
strategy reappraisal. A working model of emotion regulation in delusions that 
incorporates a vulnerability-stress-approach, cognitive models of positive symptoms and 
the process model of emotion regulation (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & 
Bebbington, 2002; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001; Gross, 2008; 
Zubin & Spring, 1977) was proposed in order to stimulate further theory-driven research 
in populations with clinically relevant delusions. A preliminary clinical implication might 
be that reappraisal in social high-stress situations should be applied with caution in 
delusion-proneness.  
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Zusammenfassung [German summary] 
Eine zunehmende Anzahl von Studien legt einen kausalen Einfluss von negativen 
Emotionen bei Wahn nahe (Ben-Zeev, Ellington, Swendsen, & Granholm, in press; 
Lincoln, Peter, Schäfer, & Moritz, 2009). Insbesondere Schwankungen von Angst und 
Selbstwertgefühl scheinen Wahnideen anstoßen zu können (Thewissen et al., 2011). Die 
Fähigkeit, negative Emotionen aktiv zu verringern bzw. herunter zu regulieren, könnte 
folglich hilfreich beim Abschwächen oder Verhindern von Wahnideen sein. Dennoch 
wurden Emotionsregulations-Strategien wie Neubewertung (d.h., die Perspektive auf eine 
Situation ändern, um die emotionale Reaktion zu beeinflussen) oder Unterdrückung des 
Gefühlsausdrucks bei Wahn bisher nicht erforscht. 
Das vorliegende Dissertationsprojekt schließt diese Lücke, indem 
Emotionsregulation bei Wahn- und Paranoia-Neigung untersucht wird. Studie 1 zeigte 
bivariate und multivariate Zusammenhänge zwischen Paranoia-Neigung und 
Schwierigkeiten bei der Emotionsregulation auf (Westermann & Lincoln, 2011). Studie 2 
demonstrierte, dass Wahnneigung mit Schwierigkeiten bei der Anwendung von 
Neubewertung in bedrohlichen Situationen einhergeht (Westermann, Rief, & Lincoln, 
submitted). Bei der Unterdrückung des Gefühlsausdrucks war das nicht der Fall. Zudem 
standen Emotionsregulations-Schwierigkeiten ausschließlich beim Neubewerten mit 
paranoiden Gedanken in Zusammenhang. Die möglicherweise maladaptive Natur von 
Neubewertung bei Wahn wurde in Studie 3 bestätigt (Westermann, Kesting, & Lincoln, 
in press). Bei sozialem Stress konnte ein Anstieg von paranoiden Gedanken nur bei 
Personen nachgewiesen werden, die Neubewertung als Emotionsregulationsstrategie 
häufig anwenden und zu Paranoia neigen. 
Auf Grundlage von sub-klinischen Stichproben weist das Dissertationsprojekt 
insgesamt auf spezifische Schwierigkeiten bei der Anwendung der üblicherweise 
hilfreichen und adaptiven Emotionsregulations-Strategie Neubewertung bei Wahn hin. 
Ein Arbeitsmodell der Emotionsregulation bei Wahn, welches einen Vulnerabilität-
Stress-Ansatz, kognitive Modelle von Positivsymptomen und das Prozessmodell der 
Emotionsregulation integriert (Freeman et al., 2002; Garety et al., 2001; Gross, 2008; 
Zubin & Spring, 1977), wird postuliert um weitere Theorie-geleitete Forschung in 
Stichproben mit klinisch relevantem Wahn anzustoßen. Als vorläufige praktische 
Implikation kann gelten, dass Neubewertung in sozial belastenden Situationen bei 
Wahnneigung nur mit Vorsicht angewendet werden sollte.   





1.1.1 Definition and characterization 
Delusions are “erroneous beliefs that usually involve a misinterpretation of 
perceptions and experiences” (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000;  
p. 299). Severe delusional beliefs are unfounded, firmly held, resistant to change, 
preoccupying, distressing, interfering with social functioning and involving personal 
reference (Freeman, 2007; Oltmanns & Maher, 1988). The content of delusional beliefs is 
manifold, but the most frequent themes are persecution (e.g. “I’m being watched by the 
secret service”) and grandiosity (e.g. “I’m Napoleon”) (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 
1999).  
Even though delusions are a symptom that can accompany various disorders such 
as affective disorders (e.g. severe depression), neurological disorders (e.g. dementia or 
epilepsy) and personality disorders (e.g. paranoid personality disorder), they are most 
common and most often investigated in the domain of schizophrenia and schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders  (Freeman & Garety, 2004). Schizophrenia is a disorder with very 
heterogeneous symptoms. Symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations are considered 
as an excess of normal psychological functioning and thus have been categorized as 
‘positive’, while symptoms such as anhedonia, flat affect or social withdrawal are 
considered as decrease in normal functioning and thus have been defined as ‘negative’ 
(Olbrich, Fritze, Lanczik, & Vauth, 2009). Delusions are predominant in the paranoid 
subtype of schizophrenia, but are marginal in the hebephrenic/disorganized and the 
catatonic subtype (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The life time prevalence of 
schizophrenia is about one percent and very stable across different regions of the world 
and cultures (Jablensky, 1995). Bio-psycho-social models of schizophrenia include 
multiple factors such as genetic predispositions, dopaminergic neurotransmitter 
dysfunction, birth complications and stress sensitivity (Olbrich et al., 2009). 
Cognitive models of psychosis and persecutory delusions emphasize the 
psychological mechanisms that underlie psychotic symptoms such as delusions and 
hallucinations. Garety et al. (2001) propose that the most common route to positive 
symptoms begins with a triggering event that leads to emotional disturbances, unspecific 
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anomalous arousal and perceptions as well as a distortion  of  cognitive  processes in 
predisposed individuals (see Figure 1). The unspecific arousal is supposed to initiate a 
search for meaning, which finally leads to the selection of an explanation of the 
anomalous experiences as externally caused and personally significant. 
 
Figure 1: Cognitive model of psychosis (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001) adapted for 
delusions. 
 
Over the last decades considerable progress in the psychological treatment of 
delusions and psychotic symptoms has been achieved (Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 
2008). Consequently, cognitive behavioral interventions for psychosis are being 
implemented in the general health systems (e.g. NICE, 2002) and demonstrate to be not 
only efficient, but also effective in psychotherapeutic standard settings (Lincoln et al., 
submitted). However, the effect sizes regarding positive symptoms are moderate (Garety, 
Bentall, & Freeman, 2008). Thus, a deeper understanding of underlying processes of 
delusions is needed in order to improve the interventions.  
1.1.2 The role of emotions in delusions 
The importance of emotions in delusions is corroborated by four routes that will 
be outlined in detail in this paragraph: (1) emotional disturbance is a risk factor for 
delusions and precede them by years, (2) stress and emotions can trigger delusional 
ideation within minutes, (3) theoretical accounts of delusions highlight the role of 
emotions, and (4) individuals with delusions evaluate emotions as central.  
Emotional disturbances occur prior to and parallel to psychotic symptoms. 
Specifically, schizophrenia, which is often accompanied by delusions, is associated with 
risk factors resembling emotional disturbance (trait anxiety, social anxiety, neuroticism). 
Also, positive symptoms including delusions are associated with affective symptoms such 
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as anxiety and depression (Freeman & Garety, 2004). Consequently, Freeman and Garety 
summarize that “the ubiquitous presence of emotional disturbance prior to full symptoms 
[…] is the key finding with regard to its potential influence on delusions […]” (2004; p. 
28).  
Over the last decade, a growing body of evidence indicates that emotional 
processes can trigger delusional ideation. Thewissen and colleagues (Thewissen et al., 
2011) have demonstrated that increases in anxiety and decreases in self-esteem precede 
paranoid ideation using an experience-sampling approach. Moreover, the impact of 
experimentally induced stress on paranoid ideation was mediated by changes in anxiety 
(Lincoln et al., 2009), and anxiety seems to affect an implicit measure of paranoid 
ideation (Westermann & Lincoln, 2010). Furthermore, experimentally induced social 
stress impacted on paranoia via changes in self-esteem in a non-clinical sample (Kesting, 
Bredenpohl, Klenke, Westermann, & Lincoln, in revision). 
As described above, the cognitive model of psychosis emphasizes the role of 
emotions in the development and maintenance of delusions (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, 
Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001). Emotions are considered to bias the selection of a 
delusional explanation of unspecific arousal, to amplify cognitive biases and to be 
involved in the maintenance of delusions. 
Finally, qualitative studies highlight the role of emotions in delusions. For 
instance, when asked about the meaning of the word ‘paranoia’, an individual with 
delusions replied: “[5 seconds pause] It means fear.” (Boyd & Gumley, 2007, p. 9). Thus, 
emotions are integral to delusion to such a great extent that individuals with persecutory 
delusions describe delusions as an emotion and not as a belief. 
Altogether, emotions such as anxiety or diminished self-esteem do not only 
accompany (persecutory) delusions, but are likely to trigger delusional ideation. Thus, 
emotions and emotional processes are integral to delusions. 
1.1.3 Cognitive biases 
Several cognitive biases are being investigated in the domain of delusions (for an 
extensive review, see Freeman, 2007). The reasoning bias called ‘Jumping to 
Conclusions’ is characterized by hasty decision-making. In the traditional beads task 
paradigm, the participants have to decide whether drawn colored beads (e.g. red and blue) 
are from one container (e.g. with 80% red beads) or the other (with 80% blue beads) by 
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inferring on their color (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991). Jumping to Conclusions is 
typically defined as deciding after one or two beads. A recent meta-analysis suggests that 
the presence of delusions is reliably associated with Jumping to Conclusions (Fine, 
Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007). Investigations using a social variant of the beads task 
indicate that self-relevant, emotionally significant situations additionally support hasty 
decision-making (Lincoln, Salzmann, Ziegler, & Westermann, 2011; Westermann, 
Salzmann, Fuchs, & Lincoln, in revision). Thus, emotional processes are likely to amplify 
the Jumping to Conclusions reasoning bias. Furthermore, ‘Theory of Mind’ deficits 
(Frith, 2004; Mehl, Rief, Mink, Lüllmann, & Lincoln, 2010) and an external-personal 
attribution bias (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001; Fear, 
1996) are also discussed as cognitive factors that support (persecutory) delusional 
ideation. 
1.1.4 Continuum hypothesis 
The assumption that psychotic symptoms including delusions lie on a continuum 
with normality is called the continuum hypothesis. An extensive systematic review on 
evidence for a continuum of psychotic experiences – rather than a dichotomy between 
‘normal’ and ‘ill’ – supported the continuum hypothesis (van Os, Linscott, Myin-
Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009). For example in a study by Freeman and 
colleagues, 10% to 20% of the participants from a non-clinical population had paranoid 
ideation with strong conviction and significant distress (Freeman et al., 2005). Also in 
line with the continuum hypothesis are findings from studies that compare groups with 
low and high subclinical paranoid ideation and clinically relevant paranoid ideation, such 
as a study investigating emotion perception by Combs, Michael and Penn (2006). As 
expected, the high subclinical group had worse emotion perception scores compared to 
the low subclinical groups, but better scores than the group with clinically relevant 
paranoid ideation. In sum, as Freeman states for persecutory delusions, “the evidence is 
substantial enough to conclude that studying non-clinical paranoid experiences will 
inform the understanding of clinically severe persecutory delusions” (Freeman, 2007,  
p. 431).  
What are the pros and cons of research using subclinical samples? Subclinical 
samples help to avoid otherwise confounding factors such as psychotropic medication, 
neuropsychological deficits and other secondary effects of illnesses. Moreover, findings 
INTRODUCTION      
 
13 
of delusional ideation in non-clinical populations help reducing stigma when used for 
psycho-education purposes in psychotherapy. Additionally, a subclinical research agenda 
helps to encourage the use of experimental paradigms to investigate the underlying 
mechanisms of delusions. This is particularly relevant in emotion research. The 
experimental investigation of emotional processes in delusions or other positive 
symptoms requires the induction of emotions. Although there is evidence that research in 
individuals with schizophrenia is ethically viable (Taylor et al., 2010), paradigms using 
emotion induction techniques should be investigated in subclinical samples prior to their 
use in clinical samples. This procedure ensures that individuals with delusions are not 
stressed unnecessarily. Self-evidently, a subclinical single-symptom research approach 
has the drawback that the generalizability of findings in subclinical populations has 
always to be proven in samples with clinically relevant symptoms.  
1.2 Emotion regulation 
1.2.1 What is emotion regulation? 
Emotion regulation can be defined as “a set of processes whereby people seek to 
redirect the spontaneous flow of their emotions” (Koole, 2009, p. 6). Specifically, 
emotion regulation refers to the ability to “influence which emotions we have, when we 
have them, and how we experience and express these emotions” (Gross, 2008, p. 497). 
Down-regulating anxiety in a job-interview in order to perform well and finally get the 
job is an example of applied emotion regulation. Generally, emotion regulation is related 
to physical and mental health (Gross & Muñoz, 1995; Sapolsky, 2007) as well as 
relationship satisfaction (Murray, 2005). 
Importantly, the term emotion regulation has to be distinguished from other 
concepts in the context of emotion research. First, emotion regulation describes the 
regulation of emotions, not the regulation by emotions (Gross, 2008; but for another view, 
see Kappas, 2011). Second, difficulties in emotion regulation are often abbreviated by the 
term emotion dysregulation. Thus, emotion dysregulation in the sense of emotion 
regulation difficulties is not equivalent to affective or emotional lability or instability1.  
                                                 
1
 For example, the Affect Lability Scales (Harvey, Greenberg, & Serper, 1989) assesses labile affect with 
questions such as “I shift back and forth from feeling perfectly calm to feeling uptight and nervous”. 
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1.2.2 The process model of emotion regulation 
A recent and research-stimulating model of emotion regulation is the process 
model of emotion regulation by Gross (2008). The model posits that an emotional 
response develops in four steps. First, an individual enters a situation. Several aspects of 
the situation gain attention. Those aspects are integrated into a meaning by an appraisal. 
This meaning elicits an emotional response. For example, there may suddenly appear a 
snake during a stroll in a forest (situation). The snake, its shape and color as well as its 
direction of movement are attended, but not the lovely flowers by the wayside any more 
(attention to specific aspects). Supported by biological predispositions, the snake is 
appraised as a threat (appraisal produces meaning). This meaning elicits subjective 
anxiety, a heightened heart rate and the action tendency to run away (response).  
In his generic model of emotion regulation, Gross (2008) postulates five families 
of emotion regulation strategies that influence the development of an emotion prior to and 
during the situation-attention-appraisal-response-cycle. The first family is called situation 
selection. It refers to the deliberate selection of situations in order to influence ones 
emotions. For example, visiting a theatre to watch a funny comedy in order to increase 
joy, or to avoid a forest known for its dangerous animals in order to keep the level of 
anxiety down, are emotion regulation strategies in the sense of situation selection. The 
second family refers to situation modification. It includes strategies that modify the 
(physical) situation directly in order to change its emotional impact2. For example, in 
order to reduce anxiety one could let down the blinds during a thunderstorm, or pick a 
stick from the forest floor that could serve for self-defense. Attentional deployment is the 
third family of emotion regulation strategies. Avoiding eye contact or distracting oneself 
by counting backwards dampens the relevance of aspects of a situation that may 
otherwise appear threatening. In this regard, attentional deployment is an internal 
“situation selection” strategy. Cognitive change is the fourth emotion regulation family. 
Changing the appraisal or meaning of a situation, for example by reappraisal, refers to 
this family. Reappraising the forest-snake-situation such that the snake is probably not 
harmful because there are no harmful snakes in the German forests is an example for 
cognitive change. The fifth and last emotion regulation strategy family is called response 
modulation and refers to the influence of physiological, experiential and behavioral 
                                                 
2
 With regard to coping, this family of strategies is called „problem-focused coping“ (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). 
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responses. Examples of response modulation are hiding one’s expression of emotions 
(expressive suppression) or drinking alcohol. 
The first four families of emotion regulation strategies are antecedent-focused, 
because they work prior to the full development of an emotional response (situation 
selection and modification, attentional deployment, and cognitive change). The last 
family, response modulation, is accordingly called response-focused. 
To date, the best studied emotion regulation strategies are reappraisal (changing 
the interpretation of a situation in order to influence emotions) and expressive suppression 
(hiding one’s feelings). A steadily growing body of research demonstrates that reappraisal 
decreases the subjective level of negative emotions such as anxiety or disgust (e.g. Gross, 
1998; Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2009; Urry, 2009). Also, the use of 
reappraisal often decreases physiological arousal assessed by electrodermal activity or 
heart rate (e.g. Gross, 1998; Hofmann et al., 2009). Expressive suppression often 
successfully prevents emotional responses from being facially expressed (Gross, 1998), 
but is accompanied by higher physiological arousal or memory deficits (Gross & 
Levenson, 1997; Hofmann et al., 2009; Richards & Gross, 2000) as well as negative 
social consequences (Butler et al., 2003). 
1.2.3 Emotion regulation and psychopathology 
In the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), the majority of 
disorders has at least one symptom that involves emotional disturbance. Thus, difficulties 
in emotion regulation seem to be inherent to psychopathology almost self-evidently. This 
speculation has been supported by extensive empirical evidence within the last decades. 
A recent comprehensive meta-analysis of emotion regulation strategies across several 
forms of psychopathology included 114 studies. The meta-analysis came to the 
conclusion that in particular maladaptive emotion regulation strategies such as rumination 
and avoidance are associated with psychopathology (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010). For example, rumination was correlated to overall psychopathology 
(r=0.40, p<0.001), whereas reappraisal was inversely correlated to psychopathology  
(r=-0.14, p<0.001).  
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1.3 Emotion regulation and delusions 
1.3.1 Why is emotion regulation relevant for delusions? 
At least three lines of argumentation point to the relevance of emotion regulation 
in delusions. First, as discussed above, (negative) emotions such as anxiety seem to 
trigger delusional ideation. Thus, the effective down-regulation of negative emotions 
should consequently reduce delusional ideation. Second, the cognitive models of positive 
symptoms and persecutory delusions propose a ‘search for meaning’ which results in 
form of a delusional belief that may be “reinforced by the relief that comes with an 
explanation” (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002b; Garety, Kuipers, 
Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001, p. 337). Furthermore, Freeman and Garety 
explicitly do not rule out the possibility that delusions may reduce the level of negative 
emotions (Freeman & Garety, 2004). Thus, delusions may have an emotion regulation 
function. Third, a growing body of evidence indicates a more frequent use of 
dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies in patients with psychosis (Livingstone, 
Harper, & Gillanders, 2009). Due to the fact that persecutory delusions are the second 
most common symptom in psychotic disorders (Appelbaum et al., 1999), a relationship 
between delusions and emotion regulation is also likely.  
1.3.2 Preliminary evidence 
Direct evidence of emotional regulation processes being relevant to delusions is 
remarkably scarce. Nonetheless, there are many studies that provide indirect evidence for 
emotion regulation processes in the development and maintenance of delusions. In the 
following, these studies are systematically discussed. Because the process model of 
emotion regulation is generic to a great extent (Gross, 2008), the findings are discussed 
according to the emotion regulation stages of this model. 
Situation selection and modification. The approach and avoidance of situations 
can be viewed as anticipatory emotion regulation. Interestingly, avoidance is common in 
the context of persecutory delusions. Within the last month, 78% of patients with 
persecutory delusions avoided certain situations (Freeman et al., 2007). Moreover, 63% 
of those patients employed safety behaviors. This can be considered as a modification of 
a situation in order to regulate one’s emotions. 
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Attentional deployment. The intentional shift of attention in order to influence 
emotions is an instance of the attentional deployment strategies in the process model of 
emotion regulation. Regarding visual attention, for example Green, Williams and 
Davidson (2003) reported that delusions are accompanied by a controlled attentional shift 
away from visual properties of negative facial expressions using visual scanpath analysis. 
Moreover, Jones and Fernyhough (2008) demonstrated that shifting the attention away 
from thoughts (i.e. thought suppression) in interaction with anxiety is associated with 
paranoia-like thoughts. 
Cognitive change. Interestingly, there are no investigations of emotion regulation 
strategies involving cognitive change such as reappraisal in the domain of delusions3. 
However, in a way delusion-like thoughts could be considered as (maladaptive) 
reappraisals of essentially neutral situations (reappraisal of a stranger as CIA agent). 
Apart from this speculative but theory-driven assumption, several factors associated with 
delusions may have the potential to disturb reappraisal processes. All cognitive biases and 
problems (Freeman, 2007) could impact on the generation of reappraisal of situations. For 
example Jumping to Conclusions may favor the selection of the first reappraisal which is 
not necessarily the best.  
Response modulation. Influencing facial expressions of emotions (e.g. ‘poker 
face’) is one common response modulation emotion regulation strategy called expressive 
suppression. In a subclinical sample, paranoid ideation and expressive suppression were 
significantly correlated (Henry et al., 2009).  
Taken together, the findings discussed above indicate that individuals with 
(persecutory) delusions use emotion regulation strategies. Many of them are potentially 
maladaptive if used inflexibly, for example excessive avoidance behavior.  
2. The present dissertation project 
2.1 Open research questions and aim of the studies 
Both empirical findings and theoretical considerations suggest that emotion 
regulation is relevant to delusions. Emotions have a pivotal role in the formation and 
maintenance of delusions as they can trigger delusional ideation (Thewissen et al., 2011). 
                                                 
3
 Except for studies that used the Thought Control Questionnaire, whose subscale “reappraisal” measures 
the reinterpretation of thoughts (e.g. ‘I try and re-interpret the thought’), not the reinterpretation of 
situations (Taylor, Graves, & Stopa, 2009). 
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Thus, preventing or decreasing negative emotions by means of adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies is desirable. Unfortunately, direct empirical investigations of 
emotion regulation in delusions are remarkably scarce. Broadening our understanding of 
the underlying processes of delusions is likely to help to improve cognitive behavioral 
interventions for delusions.  
Anxiety is a highly relevant emotion in delusions and particularly persecutory 
delusions. Furthermore, social stress that leads to anxiety and other negative emotions 
seems to have an important role in delusions, too. The negative impact of social stress 
lasts longer in individuals with schizophrenia (Perry, Henry, Sethi, & Grisham, in press) 
and the fluctuations in self-esteem mediate the impact on paranoia (Kesting et al., in 
revision). Consequently, Perry and colleagues suggest that „future studies should examine 
the use of regulatory strategies and personal responses to stigma as potential mediators in 
the maintenance of the negative effects of social exclusion“ (Perry et al., in press, p. 9).  
As a starting point of emotion regulation research in delusions, the overarching 
goal of the present dissertation project is to address three open research questions.  
1) Is the concept of emotion regulation empirically relevant to delusions? (paper 1) 
2) Which emotion regulation strategies are difficult to apply for delusion-prone 
individuals? In particular, are there specific difficulties in using the well 
investigated emotion regulation strategies reappraisal and expressive suppression 
to regulate anxiety? (paper 2) 
3) Do the emotion regulation difficulties generalize to more complex situations that 
involve social stress? (paper 3) 
2.2 Technical outline of the dissertation project 
Within the scope of this project, three independent studies were conducted. The 
first study was a correlative, exploratory self-report questionnaire study regarding general 
emotion regulation difficulties in persecutory delusions. It was conducted with a self-
programmed online survey system using the programming language PHP (www.php.net) 
and the database server MySQL (www.mysql.org).  
The second, experimental study addressed difficulties in applying the emotion 
regulation strategies expressive suppression and reappraisal in subclinical delusional 
ideation. The experimental paradigm was implemented with the software NeuroBS 
Presentation® (http://www.neurobs.com/). Because the study required the recording of 
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physiological data as objective measure of emotion regulation success (finger pulse and 
skin-conductance) using a standard biofeedback equipment, some technical challenges 
had to be overcome. Primarily, the synchronization of events in the experiment (i.e., 
presentation of a picture stimulus) with the physiological data stream had to be realized 
with a custom-built interface program using MS Visual Basic®. 
The third study investigated the effects of habitual emotion regulation using 
expressive suppression and reappraisal on state paranoia under social stress. The 
experiment was conducted via the internet, using the professional survey system 
Unipark© (www.unipark.de). Social stress was operationalized as social exclusion in the 
virtual ball-tossing game Cyberball (K. D. Williams & Jarvis, 2006). Because the most 
recent official Cyberball version was not compatible to the modern internet browsers, I 
reprogrammed an alternative Cyberball version using Javascript and HTML4. 
3. Summaries of the studies 
3.1 Summary of paper 1 
Westermann, S., & Lincoln, T. M. (2011). Emotion regulation difficulties are relevant 
to persecutory ideation. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, 
Research and Practice, 84(3), 273-287.  
3.1.1 Background 
Research on delusions has been focusing on cognitive factors but has somewhat 
neglected emotional factors. However, negative emotions precede and accompany 
persecutory delusions. Recently, a number of studies revealed that negative emotions can 
trigger persecutory ideations and mediate the effect of stress on persecutory ideation. 
Thus, the ability to down-regulate negative emotions might be beneficial in paranoid 
ideation. However, there is indirect evidence for emotion regulation difficulties in 
paranoid ideation that stems from various studies. For example, persecutory ideation is 
associated with lower emotional awareness. 
The study aims at exploring the association of potential emotion regulation 
difficulties and persecutory ideation, while taking general psychopathology as well as 
                                                 
4
 Meanwhile, this reprogrammed Javascript version of Cyberball was also used in other studies (e.g. 
emotion regulation in obesity, UKE Hamburg; emotion regulation in Asperger syndrome, Stanford 
University). It can be requested from S. Westermann, mail@stefanwestermann.com.  
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positive, negative and depressive symptoms into account. In line with the continuum 
hypothesis and due to its pilot character, the study employs a subclinical sample.  
3.1.2 Method 
A total of N=151 participants took part in the online-conducted questionnaire 
study (mean age M=31.6, SD=10.2; 85% female). Emotion regulation difficulties as well 
as the frequency of paranoid thoughts and other measures of psychopathology were 
assessed with several questionnaires. The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale was 
used to assess emotion regulation difficulties. The Paranoia Checklist assessed the 
frequency of paranoid thoughts and the associated conviction and distress. The 
Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences provided a measure of subclinical 
positive, negative and depressive symptoms. The data were analyzed with bivariate 
correlations (Bonferroni-corrected) and canonical correlational analysis.  
3.1.3 Results 
The frequency of and conviction in paranoid thoughts correlated with almost all 
assessed emotion regulation difficulties significantly and medium in effect, except for the 
Lack of Awareness scale. When statistically controlling for the shared variance with 
general psychopathology using partial correlations, the frequency of and conviction in 
paranoid thoughts were exclusively associated to impulse control difficulties (r=0.24, 
p<0.01 and r=0.17, p<0.05). 
A canonical correlational analysis explored multivariate associations between the 
emotion regulation difficulties and persecutory ideation, other positive symptoms and 
general psychopathology. Two factor pairs (i.e., multivariate correlations) were 
significant. All emotion regulation difficulties and all measures of psychopathology 
loaded on the first factor pair. The second factor was comprised of impulse control 
difficulties and (inversely) non-acceptance of emotional responses as well as the 
frequency and conviction regarding paranoid thoughts and positive symptoms.  
3.1.4 Discussion 
Persecutory ideation was accompanied by various emotion regulation difficulties. 
This is in line with the use of more dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies in 
schizophrenia. However, the difficulties were not specific to persecutory ideation: other 
positive symptoms were accompanied by emotion regulation difficulties, too, and a large 
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proportion of the shared variance was explained by general psychopathology. Whereas 
persecutory ideation was not related to emotional awareness, it was associated with lower 
emotional clarity. Thus, individuals with high persecutory ideation tend to know that they 
feel something, but do not exactly know what. Such a situation neatly resembles the 
unspecific arousal that is seen as important in the cognitive model of paranoia.  
Further research on emotion regulation in persecutory and delusional ideation is 
necessary to shed light on the underlying mechanisms. In particular, experimental 
approaches are needed to investigate emotion regulation strategies. 
3.2 Summary of paper 2 
Westermann, S., Rief, W., & Lincoln, T. M. (submitted). Emotion regulation can 
backfire in delusions - Subclinical evidence for specific difficulties in 
the reappraisal of threat.  
3.2.1 Background 
Mounting evidence suggests that anxiety triggers delusional ideation. 
Consequently, the ability to down-regulate anxiety in terms of emotion regulation would 
be beneficial to reduce delusions. However surprisingly, emotion regulation strategies 
have not been investigated in delusions.  
Two emotion regulation strategies have been extensively investigated in the past 
and might also be particularly relevant to delusions. Reappraisal describes the deliberate 
cognitive change of the initial appraisal of a situation in order to impact on the emotional 
response. Whereas adaptive reappraisal has shown to be able to down-regulate negative 
emotions and thus delusional ideation, maladaptive reappraisal theoretically has the 
means to support delusional ideation by generating delusion-like reappraisals. Expressive 
suppression involves the deliberate modification of an already fully formed emotional 
response by inhibiting facial and other behavioral expressions of emotions (e.g. poker 
face). In contrast to reappraisal, the habitual use of expressive suppression is positively 
associated with psychopathology. Moreover, expressive suppression increases 
physiological arousal and thus may trigger delusional ideation. 
The study aims at testing whether delusion-prone individuals have difficulty to 
successfully apply reappraisal, and whether unsuccessful reappraisal is associated with 
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heightened state delusional ideation. Additionally, the assumption that expressive 
suppression supports state delusional ideation is tested. 
3.2.2 Method 
The sample consisted of 86 undergraduate students (mean age M=21.2, SD=2.99; 
97% female) who filled in measures of delusion-proneness and participated in an 
experimental paradigm. During the experiment, anxiety was elicited by means of aversive 
stimuli from the International Affective Picture System and according sound effects. The 
research design involved two independent variables: delusion-proneness (between-
subject; quasi-experimental) and emotion regulation strategy (within-subject; reappraisal, 
expressive suppression, and the control condition view). The dependent variables were 
subjective emotion regulation success (self-report) and objective emotion regulation 
success (heart rate and skin-conductance level). Furthermore, state delusional ideation in 
terms of current conviction in paranoia-like thoughts was assessed via self-report. Data 
was analyzed by means of multilevel analysis in order to avoid the categorization of 
delusion-proneness and the associated loss of information. 
3.2.3 Results 
The induction of anxiety was successful according to the manipulation check. 
Generally, reappraisal and expressive suppression were more effective compared with the 
control condition that involved viewing. However, the interaction of delusion-proneness 
and emotion regulation was also significant (F(2,158)=3.70, p=0.027). This was due to 
the fact that delusion-proneness had a negative impact on emotion regulation success only 
during reappraisal but not during expressive suppression compared to viewing. Regarding 
objective emotion regulation success, the instructed strategies had no significant impact 
(p>0.30). 
Lower emotion regulation success was accompanied by higher state delusional 
ideation exclusively during reappraisal (r=-0.20, p=0.01), but not during viewing or 
suppression (p>0.45). Moreover, higher state delusional ideation was significantly 
associated with higher heart rate in the reappraisal condition, but with higher skin-
conductance level in the expressive suppression condition. 




Delusion-prone individuals had difficulties to successfully apply reappraisal, but 
not to apply expressive suppression. Moreover, emotion regulation success was 
(negatively) associated with state delusional ideation exclusively in the reappraisal 
condition.  
Reasoning biases, Theory of Mind deficits and negative interpersonal schema 
might negatively impact on the reappraisal process. Also, maladaptive reappraisals may 
act as precursors of delusion-like thoughts. Improvements of cognitive behavioral therapy 
for delusions from an emotion regulation perspective are discussed. 
 
3.3 Summary of paper 3 
Westermann, S., Kesting, M.-L., & Lincoln, T. M. (in press). Being deluded after being 
excluded? - How emotion regulation deficits in paranoia-prone 
individuals impact on state paranoia during experimentally induced 
social stress. Behavior Therapy. [accepted August 1st, 2011] 
3.3.1 Background 
Negative emotions are ascribed a key role in paranoia. One source of negative 
emotions in paranoia is social stress. An important type of social stress is social 
exclusion, which affects self-esteem and basic human needs. Paranoia is accompanied by 
objective social exclusion due to prejudices of unpredictability and danger as well as by 
perceived exclusion due to negative interpersonal schema. 
Consequently, the need for adaptive emotion regulation strategies under social 
stress is apparent. However, specific strategies in the context of social exclusion in 
delusions have not been investigated so far. The emotion regulation strategy ‘reappraisal’ 
involves the active change of the interpretation of a situation in order to modify the 
subsequent emotional response. Overall, reappraisal has shown to be effective to down-
regulate a range of negative emotions. Thus, adaptive reappraisal may prevent the 
increase of state paranoia in socially stressful situations regardless of paranoia-proneness 
(hypothesis 1a). However, maladaptive reappraisal also has the means to support state 
paranoia in paranoia-prone individuals (hypothesis 1b) when reappraisal fails. In contrast, 
expressive suppression describes the deliberate inhibition of facial and other behavioral 
    DISSERTATION STEFAN WESTERMANN 
 
24 
expressions of emotions. Expressive suppression heightens physiological arousal and thus 
is likely to increase state paranoia in paranoia-prone individuals (hypothesis 2). The aim 
of the study is to test the hypotheses by employing a subclinical sample in order to avoid 
confounding factors such as medication or neuropsychological deficits. 
3.3.2 Method 
Via the internet, N=116 participants took part in the study (mean age M=28.52, 
SD=7.85; 72% female). The between-subject design was comprised of the independent 
variables social stress, paranoia-proneness (quasi-experimental), and habitual emotion 
regulation (reappraisal or expressive suppression; quasi-experimental). The dependent 
variable was state paranoia. 
Social stress was experimentally induced with a virtual Cyberball ball-tossing 
game, in which the participants throw a ball to or catch a ball from two other virtual 
players (see paper 3, Figure 1). Whereas in the stressful social exclusion condition the 
participant never gets the ball, she or he receives the ball in the social inclusion control 
condition about every third time. Paranoia-proneness was measured with the Paranoia 
Checklist frequency scale, and state paranoia with an adapted six item state version of the 
Paranoia Checklist. Habitual emotion regulation was assessed with the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire. 
The data was analyzed with linear regression analysis including higher-order 
interaction terms. For the competing hypotheses 1a and 1b, reappraisal was entered as 
habitual emotion regulation variable. For hypothesis 2, expressive suppression was 
entered. Post-hoc analyses of interaction effects were conducted with simple slope 
analyses. 
3.3.3 Results 
The manipulation check revealed that the social stressor Cyberball successfully 
induced negative emotions. The three-way interaction of social stress, paranoia-proneness 
and habitual reappraisal was significant (p=0.01; overall model: F(8,107)=4.15, p<0.001, 
R²=24%). The decomposition of the interaction term was in line with hypothesis 1b and 
revealed that the impact of reappraisal on state paranoia in the social stress condition was 
moderated by paranoia-proneness. Specifically, reappraisal was accompanied by 
increased state paranoia under social stress in paranoia-prone individuals. The model with 
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habitual use of expressive suppression as independent variable was not significant 
(F(8,107)=1.23, p=0.289). 
3.3.4 Discussion 
The hypothesized impact of maladaptive reappraisal on state paranoia under social 
stress in paranoia-prone individuals could be confirmed (hypothesis 1b). However, 
expressive suppression had no effect on state paranoia. Building on the process model of 
emotion regulation by Gross and incorporating the cognitive model of paranoia and a 
general vulnerability-stress-framework, an emotion regulation model of delusions is 
proposed. The model describes the impact of reasoning biases and other delusion-relevant 
factors on the reappraisal process and postulates a positive feedback loop (vicious circle).  
Some preliminary clinical implications might be drawn from these findings. For 
example, using reappraisal during stressful situations may be maladaptive in paranoia-
proneness and paranoia. Thus, cognitive restructuring under high levels of stress would be 
counterproductive. However, this has to be tested in samples with clinically relevant 
levels of paranoia. 
4. Discussion 
Emotions play a critical role in delusions as they can precede and trigger 
delusional ideation (Lincoln et al., 2009; Thewissen et al., 2011). Recently, Ben-Zeev and 
colleagues corroborated the causal role for negative emotional states in delusions and 
suggested that “persecutory ideation may be addressed indirectly by interventions 
targeting anxiety and depression” (Ben-Zeev, Ellington, Swendsen, & Granholm, in 
press, p. 1). The present dissertation project has provided a starting point for developing 
such interventions, based on an emotion regulation approach.  
Three key findings were obtained. First, delusion-prone individuals were less 
successful in applying the emotion regulation strategy reappraisal in threatening 
situations. Additionally, reappraisal was associated with state delusional ideation both in 
threatening and socially stressful situations. Second, delusion- and paranoia-prone 
individuals had no difficulties applying expressive suppression. Third, various general 
emotion regulation difficulties were associated with persecutory delusions and other 
positive symptoms.  
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In the following paragraphs, the findings are discussed in light of other lines of 
research and integrated into a process model of emotion regulation in delusions. Prior to 
drawing clinical implications and presenting future lines of research, shortcomings of the 
dissertation project are taken into account.  
4.1 Emotion regulation difficulties in delusions 
4.1.1 Reappraisal 
The habitual use of reappraisal was not significantly associated with delusion- or 
paranoia-proneness in the present studies. This is in line with two studies that assessed 
delusion severity and habitual reappraisal and found no significant association between 
them (Henry, Rendell, Green, McDonald, & O’Donnell, 2008; Perry, Henry, & Grisham, 
2011). Additionally, no group differences were revealed in most of the five studies that 
investigated differences in habitual use of reappraisal in samples with psychosis or 
schizophrenia compared to healthy controls so far. Whereas three studies did not find 
group differences (Badcock, Paulik, & Maybery, 2011; Henry et al., 2008; Perry et al., 
2011), two studies found a significant or marginally significant less frequent use of 
reappraisal (Livingstone et al., 2009; van der Meer, van’t Wout, & Aleman, 2009). Thus, 
despite the often replicated negative correlation between habitual reappraisal and 
psychopathology in other clinical disorders (Aldao et al., 2010), habitual reappraisal 
seems to be independent from symptom severity in delusions. Thus, individuals with 
severe delusions who use reappraisal should occur more frequently than, for instance, 
individuals with a severe depressive episode who use reappraisal.  
However, in paranoia-prone individuals the habitual use of reappraisal was 
accompanied by an increase in state paranoia under social stress in study 3. Moreover, 
delusion-prone individuals had difficulties to apply reappraisal to threatening stimuli, and 
state paranoia was exclusively associated with lower emotion regulation success in the 
reappraisal condition. Therefore, reappraisal seems to have the potential to become 
maladaptive in delusions. This is in stark contrast to the generally adaptive nature of 
reappraisal: In various experiments in healthy samples, reappraisal effectively reduced 
anxiety, sadness and disgust (e.g. Gross & John, 2003; Hofmann et al., 2009; Richards & 
Gross, 2000). With regard to anxiety disorders, Cisler, Olatunji, Feldner, and Forsyth 
summarize that “reappraisal generally leads to less self-reported negative affect, less 
physiological reactivity, and less startle” (2010, p. 72). For instance, the instructed use of 
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reappraisal prior to an exposition therapy in claustrophobia lowered negative affect 
(Kamphuis, 2000). Also, more frequent use of reappraisal during an intervention 
predicted decreases in PTSD symptom severity (Boden, Westermann, et al., submitted). 
In the domain of depression research, reappraisal is also negatively correlated with 
symptom severity (Aldao et al., 2010; Garnefski, 2002), and the ability to effectively 
apply reappraisal seems to be a protecting factor against depressive reactions due to stress 
(Troy, Frank H Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010). To sum up, reappraisal is indeed an 
adaptive strategy in many forms of psychopathology such as anxiety and depressive 
disorders, but seems to have the potential to become maladaptive in delusions. Given that 
individuals with severe delusions are as likely to use reappraisal as individuals without 
delusions, the use of reappraisal may not be a protective factor. In fact, maladaptive 
reappraisal might support the development and maintenance of delusions.  
In study 1, some general emotion regulation difficulties were identified that might 
negatively impact on reappraisal and other emotion regulation strategies. In particular, 
persecutory ideation and other psychotic symptoms were accompanied by a lack of 
emotional clarity. Difficulties to identify feelings have been also found in patients with 
schizophrenia (van der Meer et al., 2009). The effect of low emotional clarity on emotion 
regulation has been investigated in some studies. The ability to differentiate between 
negative emotions has been shown to be associated with emotion regulation in healthy 
college students (Feldman Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001). Also, 
difficulties to identify the type of emotion have been shown to impair successful 
reappraisal in posttraumatic stress disorder (Boden, Bonn-Miller, Kashdan, Alvarez, & 
Gross, submitted). Therefore, the difficulties in applying reappraisal in delusional 
ideation might partly be due to a lack of emotional clarity.  
Taken together, individuals with delusion-proneness or delusion seem to use 
reappraisal comparatively often. Because reappraisal might be maladaptive in delusions, 
frequent use of reappraisal is not necessarily advantageous. A lack of emotional clarity 
may impair successful reappraisal. 
4.1.2 Expressive suppression 
In both studies expressive expression was expected to support delusional ideation 
via an increase in physiological arousal and negative emotions. However, no impact of 
habitual or instructed use of expressive suppression on delusional ideation has been 
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revealed. This is in line with a study that investigated emotion regulation in schizophrenia 
and found no association of expressive suppression and delusions (Henry et al., 2008). 
Interestingly, the study also revealed that flat affect is not accompanied by an overuse of 
expressive suppression, but a lack of amplification of expressive behavior.  
It has to be noted that the actual success of using expressive suppression in terms 
of facial behavior has not been measured in the present studies. Thus, the possibility that 
the intensity of facial behavior would have been correlated with delusion-proneness or 
delusional ideation cannot be excluded. However, in experimental as well as in 
experience sampling studies, the self-reported emotions were relevant to delusional 
ideation. Both theoretically and empirically, facial or other expressive behavior per se 
seems to be not relevant to delusional ideation and other positive symptoms. Thus, it is 
unlikely that the present findings regarding expressive suppression are limited by a lack 
of a direct measure of emotional expressiveness to a great extent. 
4.2 Integration of findings: The emotion regulation model of delusions 
The formulation of a working model of emotion regulation in delusions helps to 
integrate empirical findings from delusion and emotion regulation research as well as 
theoretical accounts from both fields. Additionally, a viable working model allows 
predictions that exceed the explanatory value of existing theories. However, a theory 
derived from data out of a subclinical research project is speculative in nature. 
Nonetheless, the advantages of a clearly formulated and testable model, the integration of 
findings at a process level, and the stimulation for further research may justify the risk of 
an over-fitting model. This being said, the emotion regulation model of delusions 
postulated in paper 3 will be shortly summarized, further research will be outlined and 
finally the model will be critically discussed. 
Embedded in a vulnerability stress model (Zubin & Spring, 1977), the present 
working model incorporates the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 2008) by 
specifying the underlying process with data and ideas from delusion and schizophrenia 
research (e.g. Freeman et al., 2002). The main idea of the model is that individuals with 
delusions or delusion-proneness try to regulate their emotions with the same means as 
healthy individuals. This premise allows applying the general process model by Gross. 
Even though the principal mechanisms of emotion regulation are assumed to be identical 
in individuals with and without delusions, those mechanisms are likely to be affected by 
known cognitive and emotional disturbances in delusions. 
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The present studies highlighted the role of reappraisal in delusions. Thus, we will 
take a closer look at this particular strategy. The cognitive reappraisal process has to 
establish a rival meaning of a situation. Consequently, Jumping to Conclusions, Theory of 
Mind deficits, pre-existing delusional beliefs, negative interpersonal beliefs or aberrant 
salience may negatively impact on the reappraisal process by constraining the set of 
available meanings (see Figure 2). For example, it is likely that Jumping to Conclusions 
interferes with the reappraisal process. When an alternative meaning of a situation is 
hastily selected, it may not be the most adaptive one. Additionally, negative interpersonal 
schema may attract the reappraisal process, such that an adaptive reappraisal involving 
positive interpersonal expectations is hard to construct. 
 
Figure 2: Emotion regulation model of delusions 
 
 
It is widely assumed that those biases are amplified or activated by stress, and 
recently some of those assumptions could empirically be corroborated. Stress seems to 
increase Jumping to Conclusions in delusion-prone individuals (Keefe & Warman, 2011; 
Moritz et al., in press), and the impact of anxiety on state paranoia was mediated by 
Jumping to Conclusions (Lincoln, Lange, Burau, Exner, & Moritz, 2010). Consequently, 
a vicious circle may emerge. Cognitive biases may hinder successful emotion regulation; 
unsuccessful emotion regulation may lead to more stress; stress amplifies cognitive 
biases; finally, adaptive emotion regulation becomes even more difficult (see the positive 
feedback loop in Figure 2). There are some empirical indications for such a vicious circle. 
Lin and colleagues found that subclinical psychotic experiences predicted emotion-
oriented coping (e.g., worrying) over time and, vice versa, emotion-oriented coping 
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predicted psychotic experiences over time (Lin et al., in press). Furthermore, a 
bidirectional dose-response relationship of affective dysregulation and psychotic 
experience was revealed in a 10 year prospective longitudinal study (van Rossum, 
Dominguez, Lieb, Wittchen, & van Os, 2011). Additionally, an initially higher stress 
response due to heightened stress reactivity may trigger the vicious circle even more 
(Myin-Germeys & van Os, 2007). 
Importantly, other emotion regulation stages such as attentional deployment or 
response modification are likely to be relevant to delusions, too. For example, the affect 
regulation model of substance abuse in schizophrenia (Blanchard et al., 1999) can be 
conceptualized as response modification sensu Gross. Taken together, the model 
describes how the known vulnerability factors of psychosis might impact on the process 
of emotion regulation in delusions and impede successful reappraisal. 
4.2.1 Predictions 
The emotion regulation model of delusions allows some novel predictions that 
exceed the explanatory value of the existing cognitive models (Freeman et al., 2002; 
Garety et al., 2001). First of all, it assumes that delusional beliefs are not primarily held 
because of reasoning biases and are no direct reflections of emotional disturbances, but 
are attempts to regulate emotions by means of reappraisal. Thus, delusional beliefs might 
have the hedonic function to regulate emotions (Boden & Gross, in press). Consequently, 
confirmatory or disconfirmatory evidence that could change the conviction in a 
(delusional) belief is expected to generate emotional responses. This is not in line with 
recent cognitive model that propose a unidirectional path from arousal to belief 
formation. 
Second, during high-stress situations the use of reappraisal may be maladaptive. 
Consequently, alternative emotion regulation strategies such as distraction or mindful 
acceptance may be more beneficial. However, prior to and after such situations 
reappraisal may be a strategy that is as powerful and sustainable as it is in other forms of 
psychopathology. 
Third, the positive feedback loop consisting of maladaptive reappraisal, stress, and 
the amplification of reasoning and other biases as well as dysfunctional schema explains 
the successive development of delusional belief in greater detail. For example, substance 
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that impact on physiological arousal such as caffeine or sleep deprivation may accelerate 
the feedback loop. 
Fourth, interactive effect between different stages such as attentional deployment 
and cognitive change can be taken into account. For instance, a hypervigilant attention to 
potential threat is likely to foster maladaptive reappraisal. Moreover, the combination of 
reappraisal and expressive suppression or other response-focused strategies may be 
particularly disadvantageous.   
4.2.2 Mathematical modeling 
Because the emotion regulation model of delusions is precisely defined, a 
mathematical description and analysis may be feasible. Because many relevant variables 
vary over time (e.g. emotions and appraisals), the model constitutes a dynamical system. 
Moreover, the dynamics are likely to be non-linear. For example, a reappraisal of a 
situation probably emerges abruptly. Thus, the process character of the model highlights 
the utility of non-linear modeling. Such non-linear dynamical systems consist of one or 
more differential equations that precisely describe the development of a dynamical 
system over time.  
What would be a good starting point for modeling emotion regulation in 
delusions? The present studies suggest that reappraisal plays an important role in 
delusional ideation; consequently, modeling reappraisal is straightforward. A viable 
mathematical model of reappraisal would provide clues under which circumstances 
reappraisal is adaptive or maladaptive. Additionally, several classes of maladaptive 
reappraisal could be mathematically identified and empirically tested. Borrowing from 
biological population dynamics models such as the Lotka-Volterra model (compare to 
Townsend, Begon, & Harper, 2009), one could model meanings of situations as different 
species in a shared environment. The inter-specific competition between two species may 
help to model the inter-appraisal competition between an appraisal and a reappraisal. 
Thus, the parameters under which a reappraisal competes over an appraisal could be 
systematically investigated. 
For example, such a population-based model predicts that an appraisal and a 
reappraisal will coexist when their level of competition is low. Thus, when a reappraisal 
is based on other aspects of situations than the appraisal, it can coexist in terms of a stable 
equilibrium. However, when the reappraisal and the appraisal compete for the same 
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aspects of a situation, one of them will be competitively excluded by the other according 
the Lotka-Volterra model. With regard to delusions, a “delusional reappraisal” may first 
be based on an unspecific internal arousal and thus coexist with other appraisals. 
However, there might be a point where the delusional appraisal gains such a high capacity 
(i.e., conviction) that it competitively eliminates initial appraisals and other reappraisals. 
4.2.3 Critical discussion and alternative explanations 
A main interpretation of the findings from paper 2 and 3 is that maladaptive 
reappraisal can precede delusional ideation. This is also one of the integral assumptions of 
the postulated emotion regulation model of delusions. Nevertheless, at least three 
alternative interpretations are possible. First, delusional ideation could always precede 
reappraisal. Thus, the initial appraisal would be delusional, and later reappraisal in non-
delusional ways would be difficult. However, this account could not explain why state 
delusional ideation was exclusively associated with reappraisal. Second, an independent, 
third factor may account for delusional ideation and maladaptive reappraisal. For 
example, stress might trigger delusional ideation and impair the reappraisal process. 
However, this explanation is unspecific and one has to describe in which way stress 
impact on delusional ideation and reappraisal independently. 
Additionally, there is a third alternative explanation for the association of 
reappraisal and delusional ideation. Counter-intuitively, delusional ideation may be a 
result of adaptive reappraisal. This would be the case if the down-regulation of negative 
emotion would not be the exclusive goal of delusion-prone individuals. Although almost 
all experimental emotion regulation paradigms are based on the implicit assumption that 
everybody wants to down-regulate negative emotions, this does not necessarily apply to 
delusional ideation. For example, it is conceivable that successful delusion-like 
reappraisals increase feelings of self-esteem, but have the ‘side-effect’ of increased 
anxiety. In line with this, Freeman and colleagues reported that patients who had doubt in 
their explanations without alternative explanations had lower self-worth compared to 
patients without doubt (Freeman et al., 2004). 
4.3 Shortcomings 
The primary shortcoming of the three studies of the dissertation project is the 
subclinical sampling. The generalization of the findings on clinically relevant levels of 
delusions is not possible without caution. Moreover, the theoretical model of emotion 
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regulation in delusion is theory-driven to a great extent, and lacks a robust empirical 
basis. However, in a recent pilot study with 16 individuals with paranoid schizophrenia 
and current or past delusions and 19 healthy controls, the individuals with acute or past 
delusions were significantly worse in applying reappraisal (p=0.04), but not in applying 
the control emotion regulation strategy distraction (p=0.10), according to a preliminary 
analysis (Westermann & Lincoln, in preparation). Furthermore, state paranoia was highly 
associated with emotion regulation success in the reappraisal condition (r=0.45, p<0.01), 
but only marginally associated in the distraction condition (r=0.25, p=0.06). Thus, despite 
the small sample size, the main findings of study 2 could be replicated in a clinical 
sample. Additionally as predicted by the emotion regulation model, negative interpersonal 
schema (measured with the Brief Core Schema Scale; Fowler et al., 2006) were correlated 
with difficulty to apply reappraisal in individuals with acute or past delusions (r=0.58, 
p=0.03), but there was no significant correlation within healthy participants (r=0.35, 
p=0.14). 
Furthermore, the specificity of the present findings necessitates discussion. First, 
the present studies do not allow conclusions whether the reappraisal difficulties are 
specific to delusional ideation compared to other symptoms within the domain of 
psychosis. Second, it is not clear whether maladaptive reappraisal can also occur in other 
disorders such as depression or anxiety. Until now, there is a lack of experimental 
approaches to emotion regulation in other positive symptoms such as hallucinations. 
Surprisingly, similar experiments with anxiety- or depressive disorders are also scarce. 
However, it is unlikely that maladaptive reappraisal is an exclusive phenomenon 
in delusions. From a trans-diagnostic perspective, the reappraisal process may be 
influenced by several factors that may be more or less disorder specific. This is illustrated 
by the association of general psychopathology with almost any general emotion 
regulation difficulty in study 1. Moreover, a lack of emotional clarity may be a general, 
disorder-unspecific factor that impairs reappraisal. However, which specific cognitive and 
emotional factors impact at which point in the underlying emotion regulation mechanisms 
is probably very specific for each disorder. The impact of delusion-associated factors has 
been discussed in the prior section. However, for depression early and automatic 
attentional biases might be particularly relevant (for an extensive discussion, see 
Joormann & D'Avanzato, 2010). 
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Additionally, one cannot rule out the possibility that some participants did not 
apply the instructed emotion regulation strategies. Moreover, due to the simultaneous 
assessment of emotion regulation success and state delusional ideation, no conclusions 
regarding the causal direction of effect can be drawn from the data. Lastly, the high ratio 
of female participants and selection processes due to the online data assessment in studies 
1 and 3 are limitations of the present studies.  
4.4 Clinical implications 
The empirical findings of the present dissertation project as well as the emotion 
regulation model of delusions allow several clinical implications. Due to the subclinical 
samples of the studies as well as the speculative nature of the model, these implications 
are preliminary. 
An increase of state paranoia was absent in paranoia-prone individuals that do not 
use reappraisal habitually (paper 3). Moreover, in the non-stressful situation state 
paranoia was not increased. Thus, it may be beneficial to avoid using reappraisal during 
stressful situations and with high levels of arousal (e.g. after stressful encounters, with 
sleep deprivation, with high levels of caffeine, etc.). Optimally, reappraisal should take 
place before stressful situations. Although the recommendation to not use reappraisal may 
sound counterintuitive given the similarity of cognitive restructuring and reappraisal, 
similar recommendations can be found in clinical handbooks (e.g. Allen, McHugh, & 
Barlow, 2008, p. 230). However, the beneficial effects have to be corroborated by studies 
using clinical samples. For example, one could test whether distraction during stressful 
situations is more effective than reappraisal, but reappraisal is more effective than 
distraction prior to stressful situations. Additionally, enhancing emotional clarity by 
means of a training of emotional competences (Berking, 2007) may be useful to support 
successful reappraisal and other emotion regulation strategies. According to the emotion 
regulation model of delusions that highlights the relevance of negative interpersonal 
schema, schema therapy sensu Young (1994) may be beneficial for remitted or partly 
remitted patients.  
Besides improving reappraisal or cognitive restructuring, complementary emotion 
regulation strategies could enhance interventions for delusions by reducing negative 
affect and arousal prior to reappraisal. Innovative interventions such as mindfulness 
trainings (Chadwick, Taylor, & Abba, 2005; Pinto, 2009) and loving-kindness meditation 
(Johnson et al., 2011) have already provided promising results in their pilot studies with 
DISCUSSION      
 
35 
patients with schizophrenia. Importantly, there is evidence that mindfulness and 
reappraisal can support each other over time (Garland, Gaylord, & Fredrickson, 2011). 
This “positive spiral” might be a useful phenomenon to counteract the assumed positive 
feedback loop of maladaptive reappraisal and stress in the emotion regulation model of 
delusions. Besides intervention that target on emotions, generally stress reducing 
techniques such as progressive muscle relaxation sensu Jacobson (Chen et al., 2009), 
sleep management trainings (Myers, Startup, & Freeman, 2011) or yoga (Visceglia & 
Lewis, 2011) have shown to be helpful in schizophrenia, too. Thus, those interventions 
could also support a more successful reappraisal in individuals with delusions. 
4.5 Future research and outlook 
The present findings have to be replicated in samples with clinically relevant 
levels of delusions. Moreover, the proposed emotion regulation model of delusions could 
be tested by assessing potential moderators such as cognitive biases or interpersonal 
schema. Control conditions with other antecedent emotion regulation strategies such as 
distraction may be helpful to disentangle the effect of general impaired cognitive control 
in schizophrenia from distinct reappraisal deficits. The timing of emotion regulation and 
time-dependent interactions of emotion regulation strategies are worth to be investigated, 
too. For example, the use of mindful acceptance prior to reappraisal is expected to be 
more effective than using reappraisal alone in patients with heightened stress reactivity. 
Apart from antecedent emotion regulation, exploring the regulation of emotions that are 
generated by delusions is an important open research field. 
Furthermore, there is a need for innovative, ecologically more valid emotion 
regulation paradigms. For instance, approaches that integrate experience sampling 
methods (Myin-Germeys, Birchwood, & Kwapil, 2011) and experimental manipulations 
would be desirable. When a negative emotion rises during the day, an emotion regulation 
strategy (or a control task) could be instructed using a handheld computer. At best, novel 
paradigms would also be able to assess more specific emotion regulation variables than 
self-reported affect. Regarding reappraisal, neuro-scientific methods such as fMRI may 
not only measure amygdala and prefrontal activity (Berkman & Lieberman, 2009), but 
also their functional connectivity during reappraisal. Interestingly, a study using 
connectivity analysis with psychosis-prone individuals using reappraisal revealed less 
prefrontal-amygdala coupling (Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2010). Additionally, more 
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direct assessments of cognitive control such as ego depletion may be adopted to assess 
reappraisal effort (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007).  
Finally, emotion regulation interventions such as the training of emotional 
competences (Berking, 2007) should be piloted in patients with delusions in order to 
increase emotional clarity, emotion regulation flexibility and adaptive reappraisal. 
Additionally, the effects of purely cognitive training programs such as the meta-cognitive 
training (Moritz & Woodward, 2007), which aims at manipulating reasoning biases, on 
successful reappraisal are worth to be investigated.  
Taken together, the present dissertation project provides valuable insights into 
emotion regulation in delusion by using innovative approaches (Cyberball paradigm; 
internet-based assessment), multiple indicators of emotion regulation success (self-reports 
and physiological activity), and appropriate statistical analysis techniques (multilevel 
analysis, simple slope analysis, canonical correlational analysis). Maladaptive reappraisal 
is a promising phenomenon to be investigated in individuals with clinically relevant 
delusions. The clinical implications that arise from the present integration of basic and 
clinical research may serve to improve psychological interventions for delusions and 
finally help to reduce and prevent suffering. 
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Abstract (words: 184) 
 
Introduction. Although anxiety plays a key role in delusions, its down-regulation 
using specific emotion regulation strategies has not been investigated. Reappraisal has 
been shown to be one of the most effective strategies for healthy individuals and 
individuals with anxiety disorders. However, individuals with delusions might have 
difficulties to successfully apply reappraisal. This study therefore tests the effectiveness 
of reappraisal compared to expressive suppression in individuals with varying levels of 
delusion-proneness.  
Methods. Eighty-six healthy participants with different levels of delusion-
proneness were instructed to respond to anxiety-inducing stimuli by either using 
reappraisal or expressive suppression. Subjective emotion regulation success, 
physiological arousal and state delusional ideation were assessed. 
Results. Overall, reappraisal was more effective than expressive suppression in 
regulating anxiety. However, delusion-prone individuals were less successful in applying 
reappraisal (interaction effect: F(2,158)=3.70, p=0.027) and had higher physiological 
arousal during reappraisal. Additionally, lower success in reappraising threat was 
accompanied by higher state delusional ideation (r=-0.20, p=0.013).  
Conclusions. Delusion-proneness is accompanied by difficulties in reappraising 
threat that might contribute to the formation and maintenance of clinically relevant 
delusions. Preliminary implications for the improvement of CBT for delusions are 
discussed. 
 








Mounting evidence suggests that anxiety triggers (persecutory) delusional ideation 
(Lincoln, Lange, Burau, Exner, & Moritz, 2010; Thewissen et al., 2011; Westermann & 
Lincoln, 2010) and mediates the impact of stress on delusions (Lincoln, Peter, Schäfer, & 
Moritz, 2009). Therefore, a successful down-regulation of anxiety is likely to reduce or 
even prevent delusional ideation. Surprisingly, emotion regulation (ER) has so far barely 
been investigated in individuals with delusions, although ER is known to play an 
important role in many other forms of psychopathology (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010). However, preliminary evidence suggests that individuals with 
paranoia-proneness and other psychotic-like experiences have fewer adaptive ER 
strategies available to down-regulate negative emotions (Westermann & Lincoln, in 
press).  
 The specific ER strategies reappraisal and expressive suppression are likely to be 
particularly relevant to delusions. Referring to the process model of ER (Gross, 2002), 
reappraisal is an antecedent-focused ER strategy and describes the alteration of the 
appraisal that assigns emotional significance to situations. Thus, reappraisal impacts on 
emotional responses prior to their full development (e.g. thinking about an examination as 
an opportunity to show one’s strength rather than a threat to self-worth, in order to 
increase joy and reduce anxiety). Adaptive reappraisal seems to be a protective factor 
against psychopathology in general (Aldao et al., 2010; Gross & Munoz, 1995) and 
reduces negative emotions (Gross & John, 2003) that may otherwise trigger delusional 
ideation (Lincoln, Peter, et al., 2009). For example, the spontaneous use of reappraisal 
during stressful speech reduces anxiety (Egloff, Schmukle, Burns, & Schwerdtfeger, 
2006). However, reappraisal has also the means to be maladaptive. According to Gross’ 
model of ER (2002), reappraisal involves changing the meaning of a situation. New 
meanings are not intrinsically adaptive. Consequently, maladaptive reappraisal may 
create new delusional appraisals of situations despite the original intention to down-
regulate negative emotions. Additionally, difficulties in effectively using reappraisal 
might lead to more intense (or less attenuated) anxiety that is likely to increase the risk of 
state delusional ideation (Lincoln, Lange, et al., 2010; Thewissen et al., 2011). Thus, we 
expect that unsuccessful reappraisal is associated with higher state delusional ideation. 
Expressive suppression directly influences already fully-formed experiential, 
physiological and behavioral emotional responses (e.g. suppress one’s facial expression 
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of anxiety; ‘poker face’) and is thus response-focused. In contrast to reappraisal, 
expressive suppression seems to be counterproductive if it is used habitually (Aldao & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; Aldao et al., 2010). This is found to be due to the increased 
physiological responses and higher cognitive costs (Gross & Levenson, 1997; Richards & 
Gross, 2000). Because individuals with schizophrenia have been found to be able to apply 
expressive suppression as effectively as healthy controls (Henry et al., 2007), we do not 
expect individuals with delusions to reveal specific problems in applying this strategy. 
However, expressive suppression maintains or increases negative emotions and 
physiological arousal (e.g. Gross & Levenson, 1997; Richards & Gross, 2000) that can 
trigger delusional ideation (Lincoln, Lange, et al., 2010; Thewissen et al., 2011). Thus, 
we expect expressive suppression to trigger state delusional ideation.  
The present study tests whether individuals with high delusion-proneness have 
difficulties in reappraising threatening situations. In line with the continuum hypothesis 
that implies that the psychology of delusions can be investigated at subclinical levels 
(Freeman et al., 2005; Johns & van Os, 2001) and in order to avoid confounding factors 
such as medication or neuropsychological deficits, the present study investigated the 
hypotheses in healthy participants with varying levels of delusion-proneness.  
2. Methods 
2.1 Subjects 
Eighty-six undergraduate students took part in the study. By participating they 
could partially fulfill curriculum requirements. Seven participants had to be excluded 
because the anxiety-induction failed (threat rating < 10%). The remaining 79 participants 
had a mean age of M=21.2 years (SD=2.99, range 19-36 years) and were mainly female 
(97%). 
2.2 Design  
The independent variables were ER strategy (within-subject: reappraisal, 
suppression, view) and delusion-proneness (between-subject; quasi-experimental). The 
dependent variables were subjective ER success and physiological arousal as well as state 
delusional ideation (for details see Measures).  
2.3 Paradigm 
The participants applied the instructed ER strategies (e.g., reappraisal) while 




stimulus(-compound) consisted of a picture and a sound. We selected the pictures from 
the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) according 
to norms by Mikels et al. (2005) (see footnote 5). An appropriate sound effect selected 
from the International Affective Digital Sounds system (Bradley & Lang, 2007) was 
attached to each picture to facilitate the anxiety induction.  
During the presentation of threatening stimuli (e.g. snakes), the participants 
applied the ER strategies with the aim of reducing anxiety (experimental conditions) or 
they viewed the stimuli attentively without using specific strategies (control condition). 
The instructions were: “View the picture attentively.” (view), “View the picture 
attentively. Try to reappraise your situation realistically. This is only a picture in an 
experiment and there is no danger to you.” (reappraisal), and “View the picture 
attentively. Suppress the expression of your feelings (e.g. facial expression). An outside 
person should not know that you are feeling something.” (expressive suppression).  
The experimental paradigm consisted of three blocks that corresponded to the 
reappraisal, suppression and view conditions. Each block included 18 trials. Within each 
trial, there were two phases (see Figure 1). In the baseline phase, a reminder of the 
instructed ER strategy was presented for three seconds (“reappraisal”, “suppression” or 
“view”), followed by a black screen with a white, centered fixation cross for nine 
seconds. In the regulation phase, one of the anxiety-eliciting stimuli was presented for 12 
seconds (sounds were repeated if necessary). The blocks and the stimuli within each 
block were shuffled in a random sequence for each participant to avoid order effects. We 
used the software Presentation® (version 14.109.21.09, Neurobehavioral Systems, 
Albany, CA, USA) to implement the paradigm. 
 
Figure 1: Trial course 
                                                 
5
 Used IAPS stimuli: 1019, 1022, 1030, 1040, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1070, 1080, 1090, 1110, 1113, 1120, 1200, 1201, 1220, 1230, 1240, 
1300, 1301, 1302, 1321, 1390, 1540, 1930, 1931, 2100, 2120, 3280, 5970, 5971, 5972, 6370, 8480, 9582, 9584, 9592, 9594 




Delusion-proneness. We used the Peter’s et al. Delusion Inventory (PDI; Peters, 
Joseph, & Garety, 1999) to assess the level of delusion-proneness at baseline with 40 
items concerning delusion-relevant experiences across the lifespan (e.g. “Do you ever feel 
as if people seem to drop hints about you or say things with a double meaning?”). The 
German version has adequate reliability (α=0.85) and convergent validity (Lincoln, 
Keller, & Rief, 2009; Lincoln, Ziegler, Lüllmann, Müller, & Rief, 2009). Importantly, the 
PDI seems to be unaffected by socially desirable response styles (Galbraith, Manktelow, 
& Morris, 2008). The present study assessed the frequency of delusional thoughts by 
adopting a simplified Likert response format (1=’definitely not’ to 6=’extreme’).  
Subclinical paranoia. The Paranoia Checklist (Freeman et al., 2005) measured the 
frequency of persecutory thoughts and the associated conviction and distress across the 
lifespan with 18 items at baseline and was used to cross-validate the PDI with an 
independent measure. The German version of the Paranoia Checklist has shown adequate 
reliability (Cronbach’s α=0.86) and convergent validity (Lincoln, Peter, et al., 2009; 
Lincoln, Ziegler, et al., 2009).  
Habitual emotion regulation strategies. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
(ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) was used to measure the habitual use of the ER strategies 
reappraisal (e.g. “I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation 
I’m in”) and expressive suppression (e.g. “I control my emotions by not expressing 
them”) with a Likert scale (1=’definitely not’ to 7=’definitely’) at baseline. The German 
version has demonstrated good reliability (Cronbach’s α ≥ 0.74) (Abler & Kessler, 2009).  
State anxiety, negative emotions and positive emotions. In order to check the 
validity of the emotion induction, we used the state version of the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (German version: Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996; PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) prior to (pre) and after each experimental condition. 
The items are single adjectives (e.g. joyful, nervous or jittery) and the response format is 
Likert-styled (1=’very slightly or not at all’ to 5=’very much’). We extended the PANAS 
scale by three items to assess anxiety in a more reliable manner (“worried”, “jumpy”, and 
“anxious”). From the total pool of 23 items, we constructed three scales: state anxiety (6 





Subjective ER success. Differences in the experiential emotion response (i.e., 
subjective feeling) due to the applied ER strategy were directly reported by the 
participants via a visual analog scale (more anxiety - less anxiety; see Figure 1) at the end 
of each trial. This rating served as indicator of the subjective ER success (i.e., successful 
application of the ER strategy).  
Physiological arousal. We measured the impact of the ER strategies on 
physiological arousal with the skin-conductance level (SCL) and the interbeat interval 
(IBI) of the heart rate. These data were acquired with a Thought Technology 
ProComp2™ device using the BioGraph Infiniti™ system (blood volume pulse sensor at 
256Hz, SCL sensor at 32Hz). Due to technical problems, data could only be analyzed for 
a subset of n=68 participants with complete physiological datasets. 
State delusional ideation. Participants rated their current level of conviction of 
paranoid thoughts after each block (i.e. three times). It was assessed with a percentage 
visual analog scale (“At the moment, how likely do you think is it that someone intends to 
do you harm?”) ranging from 0% to 100%. 
2.5 Procedure 
At the beginning, the participants were connected to the physiological sensors and 
a five minute relaxation phase took place. Then, participants completed the questionnaires 
and read the experimental instructions. After a training phase that could be extended if 
required, the participants completed the three experimental blocks á ten minutes with five 
minute pauses in between. Before the first block and after each block, participants 
completed the extended PANAS manipulation check questionnaire. After each block, 
their level of state delusional ideation was assessed. At the end of the experiment all 
participants were debriefed. 
2.6 Data analysis 
The hypotheses regarding the subjective ER success were tested by means of 
multilevel linear model (MLM) analysis with the experimental conditions nested in 
participants. This statistical procedure allows using delusion-proneness as continuous 
predictor and thereby avoids the problem of having to dichotomize it into groups which is 
necessary when using ANOVA approaches and leads to a loss of information (DeCoster, 
Gallucci, & Iselin, 2011). MLM was conducted with SPSS Mixed Models version 18.0 
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(SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA) according to common guidelines (Field, 2009; Tabachnik 
& Fidell, 2005).  
All variables were centered around the grand mean via z-transformation for the 
MLM, tested for normality and transformed if necessary. Because the distribution of the 
measures of state delusional ideation was extremely skewed and could not successfully be 
transformed, non-parametric tests were used to analyze these variables.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics, prerequisites and manipulation check 
The participants had a mean delusion-proneness score of M=57.79 (PDI; 
SD=14.35, range 40 to 120). Their habitual ER scores were M=4.75 (SD=0.85, range 
2.67 to 6.83) for reappraisal and M=3.00 (SD=1.08, range 1.25 to 5.25) for suppression. 
Delusion-proneness was positively correlated with the frequency, conviction and distress 
of paranoid thoughts (r=0.54, r=0.42 and r=0.35, respectively; all p<0.01), indicating 
convergent validity. There were no significant associations between delusion-proneness 
and habitual use of reappraisal or expressive suppression (both p>0.476). 
In order to evaluate the success and the specificity of the anxiety induction 
(manipulation check), we conducted three paired t-tests to compare anxiety, negative 
emotions and positive emotions at baseline and while viewing anxiety-eliciting stimuli. 
The self-reported anxiety was significantly higher during the anxiety induction (t(78)=-
4.82, p<0.01; view: M=2.37, SD=1.05; baseline: M=1.76, SD=0.73), while other negative 
emotions (excluding anxiety) did not differ (t(78)=0.45, p=0.65; view: M=1.44, SD=0.49; 
baseline: M=1.46, SD=0.49). In addition, positive emotions were lower during the 
anxiety induction (t(78)=6.16, p<0.01; view: M=2.76, SD=0.70; baseline: M=3.21, 
SD=0.73). In sum, the anxiety induction was successful in specifically evoking anxiety 
and reducing positive emotions, while not affecting other negative emotions.  
3.2 Subjective emotion regulation success 
The effect of delusion-proneness on the successful application of the ER strategies 
was analyzed by means of a multilevel analysis which was developed in five steps (see 
Table 1). Successively, a ‘null model’ without predictors (M0) was extended by the ER 




proneness (M2: χ²(1)=4.96, p=0.026), and by the interaction of the ER strategy and 
delusion-proneness (M3: χ²(2)= 7.24, p=0.027). Finally, delusion-proneness was modeled 
as random effect (M4: χ²(1)=5.98, p=0.014). For sake of brevity, only the last model M4 
will be reported in detail. 









+PDI a x strategy 
M4:  
+PDI a random  
Fixed part predictor          
Intercept 6.13 (1.04)** 1.30 (1.28) 1.37 (1.25) 1.31 (1.24) 1.49 (1.20) 
Condition      
  Reappraisal  9.81 (1.28)** 9.81 (1.28)** 9.90 (1.26)** 9.90 (1.26)** 
  Suppression  4.69 (1.28)** 4.69 (1.28)** 4.76 (1.26)** 4.76 (1.26)** 
Delusion-proneness   -2.42 (1.07)* -0.46 (0.73) 0.12 (1.45) 
Condition x Delusion-
proneness     
 
  Reappraisal (vs. view)    -3.36 (1.33)** -3.56 (1.33)** 
  Suppression (vs. view)    -2.31 (1.33) -2.31 (1.33) 
Random Part      
Level 1: RM variance 89.25 (10.04) 65.20 (7.34) 65.20 (7.34) 62.28 (7.01) 62.28 (7.01) 
Level 2: Person level var. 56.07 (14.06) 64.09 (13.87) 58.86 (13.05) 59.83 (13.03) 35.46 (12.14) 
      
Deviance (χ²) 1820.74 1771.12 1766.16 1758.92 1752.94 
BIC 1837.14 1798.46 1798.96 1802.67 1802.15 
Notes. a Peters et al. Delusion Inventory (Peters et al., 1999) 
*p<0.05. **p<0.01. 
Table 1: Results of the multilevel linear analysis of subjective emotion regulation success 
 
In the final model (M4; see Table 1), the type of ER strategy significantly 
predicted ER success (F(2,158)=31.10, p<0.001). Reappraisal and suppression were more 
effective than viewing (both p<0.001). Delusion-proneness did not significantly predict 
lower ER success (fixed part; F(1,48.50)=2.22, p=0.142). However, the interaction of 
delusion-proneness and ER strategy significantly predicted ER success (F(2,158)=3.70, 
p=0.027). The interaction arose from a non-significant prediction of ER success by 
delusion-proneness in the suppression compared to the control conditions (p=0.084) and a 
significant prediction in the reappraisal condition compared to the control condition 
(p=0.008). Thus, delusion-proneness had an impact on ER success only in the reappraisal 
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condition. A descriptive graphical depiction of the relationship between ER success and 
delusion-proneness in each ER condition is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between emotion regulation success (corrected for view baseline) and delusion-proneness 
(z-transformed). 
3.3 Physiological emotion regulation success  
We tested the ER success regarding physiological arousal with two repeated 
measure ANOVAs with the interbeat interval and the skin-conductance level as 
dependent variables and the condition as independent variable (view, reappraisal, 
suppression). Both ANOVAs were not significant (interbeat interval: F(2,134)=0.72, 
p=0.49; skin-conductance level: F(2,134)=1.18, p=0.311). Thus, the ER strategies had no 
significant impact on the indicators of physiological arousal. 
3.4 Relationship of state delusional ideation and emotion regulation  
The level of state delusional ideation did not differ across the reappraisal, 
suppression and view conditions (Friedman test; χ²(2)=0.12, p=0.943). However, 
subjective ER success and state delusional ideation were significantly correlated in the 
reappraisal condition (r=-0.20, p=0.013), but not in the expressive suppression or view 




convinced that someone intended to do them harm at the moment, when they were 
(unsuccessfully) attempting to apply reappraisal.  
Regarding physiological arousal, we analyzed the correlation of the interbeat 
interval and the skin-conductance level with the relative state delusional ideation 
(corrected for state delusional ideation in the view condition). Higher state delusional 
ideation was associated with shorter interbeat interval in the reappraisal condition (r=-
0.33, p=0.005; i.e. higher heart rate), but not in the suppression condition (r=0.06, 
p=0.601). Contrary, higher state delusional ideation was correlated to higher skin-
conductance level in the suppression condition (r=0.25, p=0.040), but not in the 
reappraisal condition (r=0.03, p=0.836). Thus, state delusional ideation was accompanied 
by a higher heart rate in the reappraisal condition and by a higher skin-conductance level 
in the suppression condition. 
4. Discussion 
When faced with anxiety-inducing stimuli, participants with higher delusion-
proneness were less successful in applying the usually helpful ER strategy reappraisal. 
Additionally, lower subjective reappraisal success was accompanied by a higher 
conviction in delusion-like thoughts. In contrast, the use of expressive suppression was 
not affected by delusion-proneness, and there was no association of subjective expressive 
suppression success and the conviction in delusion-like thoughts. However, state 
delusional ideation and skin-conductance level were correlated during expressive 
suppression. In sum, we could confirm the hypotheses that individuals with delusion-
proneness have difficulties using reappraisal but not in using expressive suppression.  
Whereas in the present and other studies the use of reappraisal reduced subjective 
anxiety and physiological arousal in general (Gross, 1998; Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, & 
Asnaani, 2009; Richards & Gross, 2000), in particular delusion-prone individuals were 
less successful in adaptively applying reappraisal. Consequently, reappraisal in 
individuals with high delusion-proneness was accompanied by maintenance of anxiety 
and an increase in heart rate. Several explanations could account for this effect. Possibly, 
adaptive reappraisal of threatening situations is hindered by cognitive biases (e.g. 
Jumping-to-Conclusions, see Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007), Theory of Mind-
deficits (Frith, 2004; Harrington, Langdon, Siegert, & McClure, 2005), pre-existing threat 
beliefs (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002), or negative 
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interpersonal schemata (Lincoln, Mehl, et al., 2010). Specifically, reasoning biases may 
lead to the hasty selection of an inappropriate reappraisal, Theory of Mind-deficits may 
make it impossible to generate helpful reappraisal concerning the intentions of others, and 
negative interpersonal schema as well as pre-existing delusional beliefs may attract the 
reappraisal process into unhelpful directions. The hypothetical constraints and dynamics 
of the possible reappraisal ‘space’ of accessible meanings of a situation – taking delusion-
relevant factors into account – are graphically depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Visualization of the possible reappraisal processss in healthy individuals (A) and individuals with 
delusions (B). Each point on the surface reflects one of the multitude of possible meanings of a situation (in the 
reappraisal space). Whereas many reappraisals are reachable in healthy individuals from the initital appraisal 
(black dot) without overcoming obstacles, the reappraisal process in individuals is hypothetized to be constrained 
by overcoming mountains and by the risk of falling into valleys with maladaptive meanings. Specifically, 
according to our model, in individuals with delusions, (a) the reappraisals that include reflection on the intentions 
of others are behind a huge, almost not passable mountain chain due to Theory of Mind deficits, (b) reappraisals 
that involve negative interpersonal expectations (e.g. paranoid beliefs) are in a valley (and thus attractive), (c) 
reappraisal that include positive interpersonal expectations (e.g. compassion from others) are on a plateau that is 
hard to reach, and (d) Jumping-to-Conclusions generates random local valleys that are not necessarily beneficial 
regarding emotion regulation. 
 
Thus, the attempt to reappraise the threatening situations may generate delusion-
like thoughts in delusion-prone individuals (e.g. “They are trying to upset me”) that might 
increase anxiety and other negative emotions in the long run. This is corroborated by the 
finding that only when using reappraisal, state delusional ideation was associated with 
unsuccessful ER. Therefore, maladaptive reappraisal in delusion-proneness might not 
merely be ineffective, but may even have the means to generate delusional thoughts. 
Consequently, we qualify this kind of maladaptive reappraisal as ‘failed reappraisal’. 




distressing, they are also a product of a deliberate attempt to reappraise a situation. Thus, 
the distress might be more acceptable. Indeed, persecutory delusions were both associated 
with higher distress and greater acceptance of negative emotions in a subclinical sample 
when controlled for general psychopathology (Westermann & Lincoln, in press). 
However, due to the correlative nature of our findings, an alternative explanation of the 
pattern is that higher state delusional ideation comes first and directly compromises the 
reappraisal attempt. To disentangle those explanations, further experimental studies are 
needed that manipulate state delusional ideation prior to reappraisal. However, the 
alternative explanation of state delusional ideation in the first place – prior to any 
reappraisal attempt – would predict an association of subjective anxiety regulation 
success and state delusional ideation also in the view and expressive suppression 
conditions, but this was not the case. 
Delusion-prone individuals had no specific difficulties in applying expressive 
suppression. This is compatible to the findings of Henry et al. (2007) that suggest specific 
difficulties in amplifying but not suppressing emotional expressions in schizophrenia. 
Moreover, whereas physiological arousal was positively associated with the current 
conviction in delusion-like thoughts in the present study, subjective ER success had no 
impact on state delusional ideation during expressive suppression. This impact of 
physiological arousal on state delusional ideation is in line with the cognitive model of 
persecutory delusions that posits that unspecific arousal triggers a search for meaning that 
finally leads to a paranoid threat belief (Freeman et al., 2002). Interestingly, delusion-
proneness had no direct impact on state delusional ideation or skin-conductance level 
during expressive suppression (r=-0.01, p=0.89). Thus, higher physiological arousal 
correlated with increased state delusional ideation, regardless of the level of delusion-
proneness. At least three explanations for this pattern are conceivable. First, arousal may 
be an unspecific stressor in a general vulnerability-stress-model that “activates” many 
types of psychopathology and is amplified by expressive suppression. Second, higher 
arousal might have been interpreted by all participants as intended harm by the 
experimenter, such that our operationalization of state delusional ideation was 
disadvantageous. Third, higher arousal triggers delusion-like thoughts in everybody. 
Several other shortcomings of the present study need to be noted. First, neither 
measures of ER were optimal: Not all participants could be analyzed regarding 
physiological variables due to technical problems. Additionally, the direct rating of 
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subjective ER success required introspection. However, the consistent finding that 
individuals with delusion-proneness demonstrated problems in applying reappraisal 
across the different measures can be considered as a strong indication of their robustness. 
Second, because of the subclinical nature of the present sample, only careful and 
preliminary conclusions regarding the population with clinically-relevant levels of 
delusions may be drawn and replication in clinical samples is required. Third, there was 
no direct measure of the effects of expressive suppression (rating of facial expressions).  
Altogether, the present study provides valuable insight into ER difficulties in 
individuals with delusion-proneness. The application of the generally helpful ER strategy 
seems to be less successful in delusion-prone individuals. Additionally, failed reappraisals 
of threatening situations might support or even cause state delusional ideation. If the 
proposed failed reappraisal approach to delusional ideation can be confirmed in 
participants with clinically-relevant levels of delusions, it provides a basis for deriving 
differentiated recommendations for psychological approaches to delusions. For example, 
it might be advantageous to initially enable patients to use reappraisal in more neutral, 
low-anxiety situations before attempting to generalize these skills to high-anxiety 
situations in which reappraisal might have adverse side-effects. Furthermore, a 
straightforward implication of the failed reappraisal hypothesis would be that individuals 
with delusions will develop less delusional thoughts during and after stressful situations if 
reappraisal is prevented. Therefore, it should be beneficial to convey alternative ER 
strategies (e.g. mindfulness- or acceptance-based approaches; see Pinto, 2009) that can be 
applied during or directly after stressful situations in order to enable adaptive reappraisal 
later on. Such empirically driven specification may add to improving cognitive behavioral 
therapy of delusions (Garety, Bentall, & Freeman, 2008; NICE, 2009; Wykes, Steel, 
Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008). In sum, the present findings shed light on the role of ER 
difficulties in individuals with delusion-proneness and help to advance the understanding 
and treatment of delusions. 
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Background. Emotion regulation (ER) has become a relevant construct to 
understanding paranoia. While the ER strategy called expressive suppression (e.g. poker 
face) may foster state paranoia by increasing arousal, another strategy called reappraisal 
(e.g. changing the perspective on situations) may reduce negative emotions and state 
paranoia when adaptively used. However, if reappraisal fails, this could increase 
paranoia. The aim of this study was to test the proposed effects of the ER strategies on 
state paranoia in the socially stressful situation of being excluded in paranoia-prone 
individuals. 
Methods. We conducted an experimental online-study with N=116 participants 
who were randomized to a social inclusion or an exclusion condition using a virtual 
Cyberball ball-tossing game. They completed questionnaires on paranoia-proneness and 
habitual ER strategies. Before and after the Cyberball task, participants rated their level of 
state paranoia. The impact of habitual ER strategies, paranoia-proneness and social stress 
on changes in state paranoia was investigated using linear regression analysis. 
Results. The three-way interaction of social stress, paranoia-proneness and 
habitual reappraisal use significantly predicted state paranoia (t(114)=2.62, p=0.010). The 
decomposition of the interaction term revealed that in the social stress condition, the 
impact of reappraisal on state paranoia was moderated by the level paranoia-proneness. 
Specifically, in high paranoia-prone individuals the use of reappraisal predicted higher 
state paranoia. The findings regarding habitual use of suppression were not significant. 
Conclusions. Although reappraisal is generally considered a functional strategy, 
its use in distressing social situations seems to be impaired in persons with higher 
paranoia-proneness. A working model of emotion dysregulation in delusions is presented 








 A growing body of research is supporting the key role of negative emotions in 
paranoia. First, emotions such as anxiety and depression are positively associated with 
paranoia (Drake et al., 2004; Freeman & Garety, 1999; Johns et al., 2004; Startup, 
Freeman, & Garety, 2007). Second, theoretical models of paranoia propose emotional 
disturbances to be a pivotal factor in the development and maintenance of paranoid threat 
beliefs (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002). Third, changes in 
emotional states such as anxiety or self-worth could affect state paranoia (Lincoln, Lange, 
Burau, Exner, & Moritz, 2010; Thewissen et al., 2011; Westermann & Lincoln, 2010). 
Non-social stress in paranoia-prone individuals increases negative emotions (Lincoln, 
Peter, Schäfer, & Moritz, 2009), but so could past or acute social stress (Ellett, Freeman, 
& Garety, 2008; Freeman & Fowler, 2009; Myin-Germeys, van Os, Schwartz, Stone, & 
Delespaul, 2001).  
Social exclusion is an important type of social stress. Experiences of social 
exclusion can stem from the ongoing stigmatization of mentally-ill persons in society. 
According to Angermeyer and Dietrich (2006, p. 174), “there is an observable tendency 
to distance oneself from people with mental disorders”, for example due to prejudices of 
unpredictability and danger. In addition, implicit self-stigma may lead to self-exclusion 
(Rüsch, Corrigan, Todd, & Bodenhausen, 2010). Also, negative interpersonal schemata 
such as being not accepted by relevant others accompany paranoid beliefs (Lincoln et al., 
2010). Thus, paranoid beliefs may lead to perceived, albeit not necessarily factual social 
exclusion. However, regardless of the nature of social exclusion, the actual experience 
leads to deprivation of basic needs, such as belonging, self-esteem, and control (Williams, 
2007). People with schizophrenia appear to undergo longer lasting effects after being 
socially excluded compared to controls, and are more likely to experience intense 
negative emotions (Perry, Henry, Sethi, & Grisham, in press). Another possible source of 
social stress in persons with paranoid beliefs is social anxiety (Martin & Penn, 2001) 
accompanied by low social rank perceptions (Gilbert, Boxall, Cheung, & Irons, 2005). 
Conclusively, individuals with paranoia are more likely to face socially stressful 
situations due to social exclusion or social anxiety, which are likely to trigger intense 
negative emotions and increase state paranoia.  
The need for adaptive emotion regulation (ER) of negative emotions in paranoia is 
apparent. However, a number of studies have identified ER deficits in persons with 
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psychosis (Livingstone, Harper, & Gillanders, 2009; van der Meer, Wout, & Aleman, 
2009). More specifically, persecutory ideation and other positive symptoms seem to be 
associated with difficulties in regulating negative emotions, for example impulse control 
problems and a lack of available ER strategies (Westermann & Lincoln, in press).  
Surprisingly, specific ER strategies have not been a target of direct investigation 
in the domain of paranoia so far. Two common and intensely investigated ER strategies 
are reappraisal and expressive suppression. Reappraisal is a cognitive regulation strategy 
“that involves construing a potentially emotion-eliciting situation in a way that changes 
its emotional impact” (Gross & John, 2003, p. 349). Thus, reappraisal changes the initial 
and spontaneous appraisal of a situation prior to the full formation of the anticipated 
emotional response in order to modify the final emotional response. For example, instead 
of viewing a job interview as potential threat for self-worth, one could reappraise it as an 
opportunity to get to know the company. This would be an adaptive strategy to decrease 
anxiety and increase more positive emotions, such as curiosity. The habitual use of 
reappraisal is shown to be positively associated with mental health (Gross & Munoz, 
1995) and seems to be a protective factor against many forms of psychopathology (Aldao, 
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). In contrast, expressive suppression describes the 
deliberate attempt to inhibit the expression of emotional experiences, including reducing 
facial affect (Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997). For example, expressive 
suppression in a job interview would involve displaying a ‘poker face’ and to avoid 
trembling. The habitual use of suppression is associated with decreased mental health and 
seems to be maladaptive if inflexibly used (Aldao, et al., 2010). Moreover, expressive 
suppression is known to increase the intensity of experienced negative emotions and 
physiological arousal (Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997). 
Although these ER strategies are well investigated in healthy individuals, it is 
unclear what impact their habitual use has in individuals with paranoia. Expressive 
suppression is likely to increase state paranoia, because it is associated with the 
maintenance of negative emotions and the increase of physiological arousal, which could 
trigger paranoia according to empirical data (Lincoln, Lange, et al., 2010; Lincoln, Peter, 
et al., 2009; Myin-Germeys & van Os, 2007) and theoretical considerations (Freeman, et 
al., 2002). The role of reappraisal in paranoia might be more complex. The adaptive 
nature of reappraisal in a range of different psychopathologies (Aldao, et al., 2010) would 




paranoia ideation. However, the adaptive use of reappraisal may be impaired by several 
factors in paranoia. Negative interpersonal schemata (Fowler et al., 2006; Lincoln, Mehl, 
et al., 2010), pre-existing threat beliefs (Freeman, et al., 2002), and cognitive biases (for a 
review, see Freeman, 2007) may constrain the space of possible reappraisals such that 
adaptive ER is unlikely. In the best case, the changed interpretations of situations may be 
ineffective, but in the worst case, they may be adverse and serve as a precursor of 
paranoid thoughts. For example, the reappraisal of a job interview such as “The 
interviewer is deliberately trying to irritate me” is likely to increase anxiety and state 
paranoia. In contrast, an adaptive reappraisal such as “The interviewer is trying to help me 
to learn something about the company” is likely to reduce anxiety (Gross, 2002). 
The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of the habitual use of reappraisal 
and expressive suppression on social stress in paranoia-prone participants. The present 
study employs a sample without clinically relevant levels of delusions. Thus, confounding 
factors can be avoided, such as medication and neuropsychological deficits. Also, the 
long-term effects of chronic social stress due to a diagnosis of schizophrenia, which are 
hard to disentangle from acute social stress (Perry, et al., in press; Williams, 2007) are 
neglected.  
We test two competing hypotheses regarding habitual use of reappraisal and one 
hypothesis regarding expressive suppression: 
(1a) The habitual use of reappraisal is accompanied by reduced state paranoia in 
socially stressful situations regardless of the level of paranoia-proneness.  
 versus  
(1b) The habitual use of reappraisal is accompanied by increased state paranoia in 
socially stressful situations in paranoia-prone individuals. 
(2) The habitual use of expressive suppression in paranoia-prone individuals 
increases state paranoia in socially stressful situations. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants took part in the present online study via the internet. In total, 960 
persons visited the survey homepage, and 221 (23%) provided informed consent. Of 
these, a total of N=116 completed the study (48% attrition rate, which is in the range of 
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other internet studies; e.g. Westermann & Lincoln, in press). The sampling procedure 
involved advertisements for the study in internet forums, social networks and public 
mailing lists. The advertisement included the topic of the study (how to deal with 
emotions), the benefits of taking part (improving scientific knowledge and methods of 
treatment as well as having the chance to win a shopping voucher) and the internet 
address. With the exception a minimum age of 18 years and sufficient German language 
skills, there were no specific inclusion criteria. Thus, individuals with mental disorders 
were neither explicitly excluded nor encouraged to take part. There was no 
reimbursement for time spent on the survey, but each participant had the chance to win 
one of eight vouchers for an online shop (total value: 150€). 
The participants were mainly female (72%) with a mean age of 28.52 (SD=7.85) 
and 78% had at least a high school degree equivalent (mean years of education=17.1, 
SD=3.3). All participants were German native speakers. Ten percent of the participants 
reported to be in psychological therapy at time of participation, and 6% reported to be 
taking psychotropic medication. 
Design 
We tested our hypotheses regarding state paranoia (dependent variable) by 
investigating the effects of experimentally induced social stress, while taking trait 
measures of paranoia-proneness and habitual ER (reappraisal and expressive 
suppression) into account (independent variables).  
Instruments 
We experimentally induced social stress with the Cyberball task (Williams, 
Cheung, & Choi, 2000). In this virtual ball-tossing game, the participants throw a ball to 
or catch a ball from two (or more) other players (see Figure 1). Either a participant is 
systematically excluded (the ball is not thrown to her) and therefore gets socially stressed 
(experimental condition), or she is socially included (the ball is thrown to her about every 
third time; control condition). The exclusion condition in Cyberball is known to reliably 
elicit negative emotional states (for a review see Williams, 2007). Thus, we used changes 






Figure 1. Screenshot of the CyberBall paradigm. 
 
State paranoia was measured by six state-adapted items of the Paranoia Checklist 
(e.g. “I am under threat from others” or “People are trying to make me upset”) with a 5-
point Likert scale (1=”not at all” to 5=”strongly”) (Freeman et al., 2005). These items 
were most sensitive to a social stress induction in another study (Kesting, Rief, 
Westermann, & Lincoln, under review). The state-adapted instruction was “How strongly 
do the following thoughts apply to you at the moment?”. To assess the manipulation 
check variables, the current intensity of the emotions frustration, anxiety, sadness, anger, 
shame and happiness were assessed with 10-point Likert-type scales (1=”does not apply” 
to 10=”does apply very strong”) that use clusters of emotional adjectives and have been 
validated in other studies (e.g. Stemmler, Heldmann, Pauls, & Scherer, 2001). For 
example, anxiety was measured with the item “I feel anxious, fearful, frightened, scared”. 
In addition, we administered several trait questionnaire measures. We used a 
German translation of the Paranoia Checklist (Freeman, et al., 2005) to assess paranoia-
proneness (frequency of paranoia thoughts in the last month) and the associated distress. 
The scale consists of 18 items (e.g. “I might be observed or followed”), each rated on a 
Likert-type scale (frequency: 1=”never” to 5=”at least daily”; distress: 1=”none” to 
5=”extreme”). The Paranoia Checklist has been shown to have excellent internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α ≥ 0.90) in previous studies (e.g. Westermann & Lincoln, 2010) 
and was developed to assess paranoia in non-clinical populations (Freeman, et al., 2005). 
We used the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003; German 
version: Abler & Kessler, 2009) to assess the habitual use of the ER strategies expressive 
suppression (e.g. “I control my emotions by not expressing them”) and reappraisal (e.g. 
“I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in”). Each 
item is rated on a Likert-type scale (1=”strongly disagree” to 7=”strongly agree”). The 
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subscales of the German version have adequate to good internal consistencies 
(Cronbach’s α>0.74). The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire was designed to assess 
individual differences of habitual ER in non-clinical populations. 
 The German version of the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Heinrichs et al., 
2002) has excellent reliability (Cronbach’s α=0.93) and was used to control for the 
possible impact of social anxiety on the extent of negative emotions caused by the 
Cyberball game. The questionnaire contains 20 items (e.g. “I tense up if I meet an 
acquaintance in the street”) that are rated on a Likert-type scale (1=”not at all” to 5=”very 
strong”) and has previously been used in non-clinical populations (e.g. Gore, Carter, & 
Parker, 2002). 
Procedure 
After confirming the informed consent, the participants filled in demographic data 
and the trait questionnaires. The sequence of the questionnaires and the items were 
randomized for each participant to avoid order effects. The questionnaires were followed 
by an online version of the CyberBall task. Before and after the Cyberball task, 
participants rated state paranoia and current emotional state. At the end participants had 
the opportunity to take part in the lottery and in a follow up study by providing their 
email address. Finally, an email address and a phone number for further requests were 
provided to the participants on the last page. The online study was implemented with the 
Unipark software (www.unipark.de; version 7.1) using a custom-build JavaScript 
adaption of the CyberBall paradigm.  
Data analysis 
The hypotheses were tested using linear regression analyses with state paranoia as 
dependent variable. For the hypotheses regarding reappraisal (hypotheses 1a and 1b), we 
entered habitual use of reappraisal, paranoia-proneness and social stress as independent 
variables. For the hypothesis regarding expressive suppression (hypothesis 2), we entered 
habitual use of expressive suppression, paranoia-proneness and social stress as 
independent variables. Additionally, social anxiety was entered as covariate in both linear 
regression models. 
All variables were mean-centered. In order to decompose interaction effects, 
subsequent analyses were conducted including simple slope analysis (see Bauer & 




the paranoia-proneness scores were not distributed normally, but could be normalized by 
a logarithmic transformation. The emotional state manipulation check variables were not 
normally distributed and were consequently investigated with non-parametric tests. All 
analyses are two-tailed, if not otherwise specified.  
Results 
The descriptive statistics as well as the reliabilities of all questionnaires are 
presented in Table 1 (right-hand side). The habitual use of reappraisal and suppression 
(M=25.00, SD=7.40 and M=14.06, SD=5.57, respectively) was comparable to studies 
with healthy individuals (M=24.96, SD=6.42 and M=12.76, SD=4.12, respectively; Abler 
& Kessler, 2009) and patients with psychosis (for example M=24.19, SD=8.63 and 
M=16.81, SD=5.76, respectively; Livingstone, Harper, & Gillanders, 2009). Our measure 
of paranoia-proneness, which was the frequency of paranoid thoughts, was lower than in 
a sample with acute and remitted delusions (M=24.74, SD=9.40 vs. M=34.92, SD=3.52; 
Lincoln, Ziegler, Lüllmann, Müller, & Rief, 2009). All measures demonstrated good 
reliability (Cronbach’s α≥0.79; see Table 1 right-hand side). The intercorrelations of the 
questionnaires are displayed in Table 1 (left-hand side): Paranoia-proneness and the 
associated distress were highly correlated. Habitual use of reappraisal and expressive 
suppression were not significantly correlated. Social anxiety was positively correlated 
with paranoia-proneness and the associated distress as well as with expressive 
suppression. Moreover, social anxiety was negatively correlated with reappraisal.  
PC   ERQ SIAS Cron- 
  Distress   Reappraisal Suppression   Total    M (SD) Range bach's α 
Paranoia Checklist (PC) 
  Paranoia- 
  pronenessa 0.74** -0.16 0.18# 0.50** 24.74 (9.40) 18-63 0.93 
  Distress -0.18# 0.07 0.43** 25.90 (10.49) 18-75 0.93 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
  Reappraisal -0.17# -0.24** 25.00 (7.40) 6-39 0.83 
  Suppression 0.22* 14.06 (5.57) 4-28 0.79 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) 
  Total score               42.87 (10.67) 20-78   0.84 
Note. a: Frequency of paranoid thoughts.  
**: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, #: p<0.10 
Table 1. Bivariate correlations between all questionnaire measures (left-hand side) as well as descriptive statistics 
and reliability (right-hand side). 




First, we investigated whether the Cyberball task was successful in inducing social 
stress. For this purpose, we tested whether the intensity of negative emotions was higher 
in the social exclusion condition than in the social inclusion condition using multiple one-
tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests. Before the analysis, we corrected each score for baseline 
differences (i.e. subtraction of baseline score).  
As expected, the intensities of negative emotions were significantly higher in the 
social exclusion condition compared to the social inclusion condition with regard to 
frustration (Mexclusion=0.21 vs. Minclusion=-1.32; p<0.001, effect size r=0.31), shame (0.33 
vs. -0.75; p=0.002, effect size r=0.26), anger (0.35 vs. -0.83; p=0.013, effect size r=0.21), 
anxiety (-0.25 vs. -1.03; p=0.025, effect size r=0.18) and sadness (-0.79 vs. -1.80; 
p=0.027, effect size r=0.18). The intensity of happiness did not differ between the 
conditions (Mexclusion=-0.70 vs. Minclusion=-0.24; p=0.36, effect size r=0.03). Thus, the 
induction of social stress by means of social exclusion was effective. 
Hypothesis tests 
Having found the induction of social stress to be successful, we then tested our 
main hypotheses using linear regression analysis. The dependent variable for each 
following analysis was the baseline-corrected state paranoia score (state paranoia=state 
paranoiapost - state paranoiabaseline). Social anxiety was used as a covariate due to its impact 
on the social stress induction (see above) and its correlation with every other variable of 
interest. 
As a first step, we tested the two competing hypotheses regarding reappraisal. For 
this purpose, state paranoia was regressed on social stress, reappraisal, paranoia-
proneness, and their two-way and three-way interaction terms as well as on the covariate 
social anxiety (see Table 2, left-hand side). If reappraisal is adaptive under social stress, 
regardless of the level of paranoia-proneness (hypothesis 1a), the interaction term social 
stress*reappraisal would be expected to be significant and the interaction term social 
stress*reappraisal*paranoia-proneness would be expected to be non-significant. 
Specifically, in the social stress condition, the more frequent use of reappraisal is, the less 
state paranoia is expected. In the social inclusion condition, we expect no association 
between reappraisal and state paranoia. If, however, the adaptivity of reappraisal under 
social stress is a function of paranoia-proneness (hypothesis 1b), we would expect the 




condition that the more frequent paranoia-prone individuals use reappraisal, the higher 
their level of state paranoia is. In contrast, in not paranoia-prone individuals no impact of 
reappraisal on state paranoia is expected. Overall, the linear regression model 
significantly explained 24% of the individual differences in state paranoia, 
F(8,107)=4.15, p<0.001. In accordance with hypothesis 1b, the three-way interaction of 
social stress, reappraisal, and paranoia-proneness significantly predicted state paranoia 
(b=0.44, p=0.010), but not the two-way interaction of social stress and reappraisal 
(b=0.22, p=0.207). Also, no other predictor variable was significant, including the 







Effect b  SE β 
 
b  SE β 
Social anxiety 0.07 0.10 0.07 
 
0.03 0.11 0.03 
Social stress -0.01 0.17 -0.01 
 
-0.04 0.19 -0.02 
Emotion regulationa 0.04 0.13 0.04 
 
-0.02 0.14 -0.02 
Paranoia-proneness 0.13 0.13 0.13 
 
0.17 0.14 0.17 
Emotion regulationa * Social stress 0.22 0.18 0.18 
 
-0.07 0.19 -0.05 
Emotion regulationa * Paranoia-proneness -0.04 0.14 -0.05 
 
0.19 0.13 0.22 
Social stress * Paranoia-proneness -0.10 0.18 -0.07 
 
-0.23 0.19 -0.16 
Emotion regulationa * Social stress *  
   Paranoia-proneness 
0.44 0.17 0.43** 
 
-0.41 0.17 -0.37* 
Note. R²= 0.24 for reappraisal (F(8,107)=4.15, p<0.001) and R²=0.08 for expressive suppression 
(F(8,107)=1.23, p=0.289). a: Emotion regulation represents reappraisal in the left-hand side 
columns and expressive suppression in the right-hand side columns.  
**p<0.01. *p<0.05. 
 
Table 2. Regression of state paranoia (baseline corrected) on social anxiety (covariate), social stress 
(dichotomous: 0=social inclusion, 1=social exclusion/social stress), emotion regulation strategy (left-hand side: 
reappraisal; right-hand side: expressive suppression), paranoia-proneness and their interaction effects (two-way 
and three-way). 
 
We then decomposed the three-way interaction of social stress, paranoia-
proneness, and reappraisal in two steps. For the sake of simplicity, we omitted the 
covariate social anxiety from these analyses due to its statistical insignificance in the 
main analysis. In the first step, two separate linear regressions with reappraisal, 
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paranoia-proneness, and their interaction were computed for social inclusion and social 
exclusion (see Table 3). In accordance with our hypothesis 1b, the linear regression 
model was not significant in the social inclusion condition, R²=0.03, F(3,55)=0.58, 
p=0.629, but was significant in the social exclusion condition, R²=0.43, F(3,53)=13.53, 
p<0.001. State paranoia in the social exclusion condition was significantly predicted by 
the two-way interaction of reappraisal and paranoia-proneness (b=0.39, p<0.001) as well 





Effect b SE β 
 
b SE β 
Reappraisal 0.03 0.15 0.03   0.26 0.10 0.28* 
Paranoia-proneness 0.16 0.14 0.16 
 
0.06 0.11 0.06 
Reappraisal * Paranoia-proneness -0.04 0.16 -0.04   0.39 0.08 0.55** 
Note. R²= 0.03 for social inclusion (F(3,55)=0.58, p=0.629) and R²=0.43 for social exclusion 
(F(3,53)=13.53, p<0.001).  
**p<0.01. *p<0.05. 
Table 3. Results from the post-hoc regression of state paranoia (baseline corrected) on reappraisal, paranoia-
proneness and their two-way interaction for social inclusion (left-hand side) and social exclusion (i.e. social 
stress; right-hand side). 
 
To further probe the two-way interaction between reappraisal and paranoia-
proneness under social stress, we computed simple intercepts and simple slopes for the 
prediction of state paranoia by reappraisal at the mean of paranoia-proneness and at one 
standard deviation above and below the mean (see Figure 2). The simple slopes of 
reappraisal at medium and high paranoia-proneness were statistically significant (b=0.26, 
p<0.001 and b=0.66, p=0.041, respectively; two-tailed). Furthermore, we computed the 
regions of significance for paranoia-proneness, which contain the values of paranoia-
proneness at which the simple slope is significant. The lower region of significance was 
z=-∞ to -1.47 and the upper region of significance was z=-0.15 to ∞. Thus, in average 
paranoia-proneness and above (>mean) the use of reappraisal significantly predicted 
higher state paranoia. Also, in very low levels of paranoia-proneness (about <1.5SD), the 
use of reappraisal significantly predicted lower state paranoia (compare to Figure 2). 




under social stress is associated with higher state paranoia in individuals with higher 
paranoia-proneness. 
 
Figure 2. Plot of the simple slopes of the relation between (baseline-corrected) state paranoia and habitual usage 
of reappraisal as function of high, medium and low paranoia-proneness. Note. High, medium and low values of 
paranoia-proneness are defined as 1SD above the mean, at the mean and 1SD below the mean, respectively. 
 
We then tested our hypothesis regarding the impact of expressive suppression on 
state paranoia under social stress in individuals with higher paranoia-proneness. State 
paranoia was regressed on social stress, suppression and paranoia-proneness as well as 
the two- and three-way interactions. The linear regression model did not reach 
significance, F(8,107)=1.23, p=0.289, and explained only eight percent of the individual 
differences of state paranoia (R²=0.08). However, the three-way interaction term was 
significant, b=-0.41, p=0.019. Nonetheless, we did not conduct subsequent analyses 
because the amount of explained variance was small and lacked practical significance.  
Discussion 
The present study aimed to test hypotheses regarding the habitual use of the ER 
strategies reappraisal and expressive suppression in paranoia-prone individuals during 
social stress. The habitual use of reappraisal was accompanied by higher state paranoia 
after social exclusion in paranoia-prone individuals (hypothesis 1b). A generally 
functional effect of reappraisal in social stressful situations could not be confirmed 
(hypothesis 1a). Hypothesis 2 stated that expressive suppression is accompanied by an 
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increase in state paranoia and had to be rejected, because no impact of habitual 
suppression on state paranoia was revealed. 
Contrary to the view that reappraisal is generally an adaptive way to regulate 
emotions (Aldao, et al., 2010), the present findings indicate that the use of reappraisal in 
socially stressful situations can be maladaptive in paranoia-prone individuals. The finding 
of maladaptive ER is in line with a recent study by our group that reports an association 
of limited access to effective ER strategies with paranoia and other positive symptoms 
(Westermann & Lincoln, in press). Moreover, the reappraisal of anxiety-eliciting stimuli 
has also been shown to be impaired in a subclinical sample in high levels of delusion-
proneness (Westermann, Rief, & Lincoln, in preperation). Additional evidence for a 
critical role of reappraisal in paranoia is provided by a study focusing on meta-cognitive 
beliefs in subclinical paranoia (Taylor, Graves, & Stopa, 2009). The habitual use of the 
strategies worry and punishment (i.e., self-punishment for having a thought) measured by 
the Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells & Davies, 1994) was accounted for by anxiety, 
but reappraisal was exclusively accounted for by trait paranoia. Thus, there are several 
lines of evidence that indicate that persons with higher paranoia-proneness seem to have 
difficulties in using reappraisal strategies to down-regulate negative emotions. Since 
maladaptive reappraisal may lead to higher levels of negative emotions and trigger 
delusions, not using reappraisal in stressful situations may be beneficial for individuals 
with paranoia-proneness or paranoia. 
Social exclusion was not accompanied by an increase of state paranoia in 
paranoia-prone individuals who reported to habitually use expressive suppression. 
Although this finding is not in line with our expectations, it is in line with other studies 
that did not reveal an association of expressive suppression and levels of delusions in 
delusion-prone individuals or patients with clinically relevant delusions (Henry, Rendell, 
Green, McDonald, & O Donnell, 2008; Westermann, et al., in preperation). Interestingly, 
another experimental study showed that individuals with schizophrenia have difficulties 
with the amplification of expressive behavior, but not with its suppression (Henry et al., 
2007).  
Several limitations of the present study should be mentioned. First, even though 
the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003) that measured habitual 
reappraisal and expressive suppression is a frequently used, reliable, and valid instrument, 




assessed. Therefore, it is possible that individuals who reported a habitual use of 
reappraisal or suppression did not apply these strategies in this specific experimental 
situation. However, Egloff, Schmukle, Burns and Schwerdtfeger (2006) found habitual 
use of reappraisal and suppression to be correlated to its actual use during an imaginative 
speech scenario in healthy individuals with a medium effect-size. Moreover, habitual use 
of reappraisal accounted for similar neural activation as instructed reappraisal (Drabant, 
McRae, Manuck, Hariri, & Gross, 2009). Consequently, it is likely that the participants 
used those ER strategies during the Cyberball game that they reported to habitually use. 
Nonetheless, future studies should directly examine the strategies used in these specific 
situations. Furthermore, not only the habitual use of specific ER strategies should be 
assessed, but also their efficacy.  
Second, building on the empirical evidence for a continuum between normal and 
delusional beliefs (see e.g. Freeman, et al., 2005; Johns & van Os, 2001) and their risk 
factors (Combs, Michael, & Penn, 2006), the sample comprised of individuals with not 
clinically relevant paranoid beliefs. Even though this approach avoids confounding 
factors, such as neuroleptic medication, neuropsychological deficits and severe negative 
symptoms, the present findings cannot directly be generalized to clinical paranoia.  
Third, the present study was deployed via the internet. Whereas this is not a 
shortcoming per se, online-conducted experimental studies are a novel approach. 
However, there is growing literature which indicates that classical and online-based data 
collection is essentially equivalent (Jones, Fernyhough, de-Wit, & Meins, 2008; Ritter, 
Lorig, Laurent, & Matthews, 2004). Even in samples with schizophrenia patients, online 
studies are feasible (Chinman, Young, Schell, Hassell, & Mintz, 2004; Moritz, Peters, 
Larøi, & Lincoln, 2010). Therefore, the validity of the present study is likely to be 
comparable to traditional laboratory experiments. Technical mechanisms were 
implemented to avoid multiple or non-serious participation (via cookies, double check of 
demographic data). Generally, attrition rates are higher in online studies (Birnbaum, 
2004) and the present rate is comparable to other internet-based studies in German-
speaking countries (e.g., 42% attrition rate in Westermann & Lincoln, in press).  
Finally, the specificity of the reappraisal impairments to paranoia cannot be 
evaluated with the present design, because no other positive symptoms such as 
hallucinations or other types of delusional beliefs were assessed. Nonetheless, a recent 
study on ER in patients with schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations revealed no 
    DISSERTATION STEFAN WESTERMANN 
 
98 
differences in reappraisal compared to a healthy control group, and no association of 
reappraisal and severity of auditory hallucinations (Badcock, Paulik, & Maybery, 2011). 
Thus, the current findings could be specific to paranoia. 
In sum, the present finding of an adverse effect of reappraisal in paranoia-prone 
individuals during social stress, in accordance with the discussed literature on this topic, 
provides the impetus for the formulation of an ER perspective on delusional ideation. On 
the basis of the process model of ER (Gross, 2001), the cognitive model of paranoia 
(Freeman, et al., 2002), and a general vulnerability-stress-model (Zubin & Spring, 1977), 
we developed a working model of emotion dysregulation in delusions (see Figure 3). This 
working model includes four essential assumptions: (1) Similar to healthy individuals, 
persons who are prone to persecutory delusions try to down-regulate their negative 
emotions by using reappraisal and other strategies (Gross, 2001; Koole, 2009). (2) 
However, cognitive biases [such as Jumping to Conclusions (Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & 
Gold, 2007) and Theory of Mind deficits (Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009)], negative 
interpersonal schemata (Lincoln, Mehl, et al., 2010), pre-existing delusional beliefs 
(Freeman, et al., 2002; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001) and 
aberrant salience (Kapur, 2003) disturb the successful reappraisal, resulting in failed 
reappraisal. (3) These failed reappraisals give rise to - or already are - paranoid thoughts, 
which increase negative emotions and arousal. (4) In terms of a positive feedback loop, 
the negative emotions increase the level of stress, so that cognitive biases, pre-existing 
beliefs, and interpersonal schemata are even more strongly activated.  
For example, a delusion-prone individual who experiences himself as being 
excluded in a game, will attempt to down-regulate his negative emotions via reappraisal, 
and in doing so is likely to jump to conclusions that are congruent with his interpersonal 
schema (“others are bad”) resulting in a failed reappraisal (“They are excluding me on 
purpose”). As a result he or she would experience an increase anxiety, which is likely to 
reinforce the schema and amplify the biases. Additionally, in following iterations of the 
process the individual may even generate more dysfunctional reappraisals (e.g. “They are 
deliberately trying to harm me”, “They would kill me if they could”), which reinforce 






Figure 3. Emotion regulation model of delusional ideation 
 
However, there is at least one plausible alternative explanation for our findings. A 
cognitive behavioral perspective might predict that distressed individuals in general and 
thus also paranoia-prone individuals experience more disabling automatic thoughts 
overall and may habitually attempt to use reappraisal simply due to their higher level of 
distress. Therefore, one would expect to find other indicators of higher distress to be 
associated with more frequent use of reappraisal. However, this does not seem to be the 
case, as for example symptoms of depression and anxiety have been found to be 
negatively correlated to the frequency of reappraisal strategies in a recent meta-analysis 
investigating a diverse patient population (r=-0.14, p<0.001; Aldao, et al., 2010).  
Our proposed ER working model of delusions allows several interesting 
implications. It can soundly explain why neutral situations can trigger state paranoia 
when a sufficient level of stress is present. Moreover, the positive feedback loop explains 
the reinforcement of delusional beliefs and interpersonal schemata. This could explain 
why paranoia-prone individuals more willingly accept the truthfulness of paranoid 
reappraisals (Lincoln, Reumann, & Moritz, 2010). Lastly, the level of stress is the main 
moderator in the model that determines the influence of cognitive biases, pre-existing 
threat beliefs, and interpersonal schemata on the reappraisal process. Furthermore, the 
model has important clinical implications which imply that delusional ideation may be a 
genuine attempt to regulate one’s own emotions. In addition, the working model is able to 
easily integrate other ER processes and helps to understand and disentangle their temporal 
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interactions. For example, the difficulties in the amplification of (positive) emotions 
(Henry, et al., 2008) are likely to be relevant in the response ER stage.  
However, even though the parsimonious and experimentally testable working 
model integrates aspects from several models and many empirical findings (Beck, Rector, 
Stolar, & Grant, 2008; Freeman, et al., 2002; Garety, et al., 2001; Gross, 2001; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984), it is currently speculative and requires further research with 
experimental and longitudinal designs. Nonetheless, clinicians may take emotion 
dysregulation into account when formulating individual disorder models. In particular, 
reappraisal seems to unfold adverse effects when applied by individuals with delusions in 
stressful situations. Also, the use of expressive suppression per se does not seem to trigger 
paranoia if it is flexibly used, although the chronic use of suppression is likely to have the 
same adverse effects on interpersonal functioning as in healthy individuals (Gross & 
John, 2003). Trainings of alternative ER strategies as promoted in a training program by 
Berking (2007) may be useful. For example, mindfulness-based strategies to reduce the 
overall stress level prior to reappraising prospective or past situations may be a beneficial 
recommendation. Furthermore, alternative in-situation strategies such as acceptance or 
distraction may be more helpful to regulate negative situations under stress than 
reappraisal, but further research is needed to corroborate this deduction. Conclusively, the 
present basic research findings underline the importance and usefulness of cognitive 
interventions for delusions in order to support adaptive reappraisals, but also help to 
understand its current limitations in patients with delusions. 
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